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“Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again         
and expecting different results”    
                                                  - Albert Einstein 
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Abstract  
The key objective of this thesis is to understand how results-based aid affects the degree of recipient-
country ownership. The approach to understand the relationship between ‘results-based aid’ and 
‘ownership’; is based on a study of the dynamics of the aid relationship in the partnership era of aid 
management. This research primarily focuses on the donor-side of the aid relationship, by studying 
how donors design and implement aid modalities. The concept of ‘ownership’ is studied from a power 
perspective, therefore ‘ownership’ is understood as a change in the institutional relationship guiding 
the interactions between donors and recipients. The study is based on a wide framework of theoretical 
perspectives, which constitute the foundation for understanding the power dynamics of the aid 
relationship and donor behaviour. Based on a qualitative research approach rooted in the documentary 
research method, the analysis seeks to establish an in-depth understanding of the barriers to improve 
recipient-country ownership within the current aid system. This is achieved by analysing and 
discussing the current experiences with implementing partnership-based aid modalities, which market 
themselves on their potential on improving recipient-country ownership. Here, the results-based aid 
modality is of significant interest. This is because the theoretical rationale underlying the modality, 
seeks to fulfil the core principles of the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ of managing for development 
results, while ensuring improved recipient-country ownership. However, the analysis of the 
relationship between ‘ownership’ and the aid modalities of the partnership era reveal that the 
modalities fall short of their aim of improving recipient-country ownership. This is to a large extent 
due to how donors choose to design and implement the aid programmes based on new aid practices. 
However, the mechanisms and procedures embedded in these practices, also contribute to maintaining 
the unequal power relations defining the aid relationship. The analysis identifies some of the pitfalls 
of the current aid system to improve recipient-country ownership. Thus, this thesis argues for the 
need to break with the institutionalised behaviour and embedded mind-sets; which maintains the 
necessity for donors to be in control of recipients’ development processes and insist on applying ‘best 
practices’ in development cooperation. The study concludes that for new aid modalities, like results-
based aid, to be effective in improving recipient-country ownership, it is necessary to acknowledge 
the complexity of development cooperation; and use the modalities to learn more about what works 
and how to innovate international aid practices.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 The Relationship between ‘Ownership’ and ‘Managing for Results’   
Despite the transfer of trillions of dollars in gross Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1960 
to developing countries, a substantial amount of the world’s population remain in extreme poverty 
and experience stagnant growth (Easterly & Williamson, 2012:4). The global development aid regime 
originated in 1960, and, remains the primary conduit for the delivery of ODA to the world’s 
impoverished states. However, aid practices have been highly criticised, and today, half a century 
since its inception, the development aid regime faces unprecedented challenges as the primary 
facilitator of North-South economic cooperation (Hook and Rumsey, 2015:1). Aid recipients and 
advocates for a different aid system, have voiced grievances about donor practices for decades by 
pointing out; that the terms and functions of ODA flows are dictated by elites in donor states, and that 
the  conditions for ODA reflects a neo-liberal bias (Easterly and Williamson, 2012). Concurrently we 
have seen the development aid regime incrementally change in the constant search for better and more 
effective aid approaches. As argued by Riddell (2007:2), “[…] aid has managed to repeatedly 
reinvent and renew itself after repeated bouts of uncertainty, doubt and pessimism”. These changes 
manifest themselves in new principles, strategies, practices, models and financing instruments, which 
often are underpinned by lofty political rhetoric and development ‘buzzwords’ (Cornwall & Brock, 
2005). The ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ is the latest example of how the aid system seeks to change 
and reinvent itself in the face of criticism. The ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ consists of wide-scale 
political declarations, signed by developed and developing countries, committing all signees to adhere 
to principles determined to improve the effectiveness of aid.  The ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ 
emerged in 2002 as a result of the first High-Level Forum on Global Development Cooperation, with 
the signing of the Rome Declaration. Since then, three additional declarations have been signed, ‘The 
Paris Declaration’ (2005), ‘The Accra Agenda for Action’ (2008) and ‘The Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation’ (2011)1. Drawing on lessons from over 50 years of development 
cooperation, the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ identifies the following challenges to aid effectiveness: 
lack of local ownership; increased fragmentation; high transaction costs as well as parallel systems, 
and solutions that are not well adapted with local needs and conditions (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 
2011:1).  
                                                   
1 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ 
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The declarations on aid effectiveness contain different principles to accommodate these challenges, 
however, two principles recur in all three declaration: ‘Ownership’ and ‘Managing for Results’. Thus, 
this thesis considers these two principles to constitute the core of the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’, 
and find it relevant to understand the relationship between them.  
The Ownership Agenda  
The ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’’s focus on ‘ownership’ is a reintroduction of a principle, which has 
been discussed since the mid-1980s (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009:3).The principle is tied to the 
realisation that ‘country ownership’ is important to the success of development efforts (Booth, 2011). 
The underlying assumption in the donor community, of the importance of ‘ownership’, is that 
governments will be more interested in making good use of the foreign aid they receive, if they are 
allowed to decide their own policy priorities and strategies (Hyden, 2008:25). The concept of 
recipient-county ownership is linked to the emergence of the partnership era within development 
cooperation during the 1990’s, where development assistance found itself in a deep legitimacy crisis. 
The concepts of ‘partnerships’ and ‘ownership’ played and still play a significant part in attempts to 
morally rehabilitate the aid industry (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009:76). According to Whitfield and Fraser 
(2009) the partnership era refers to a change in the thinking about: the aims of aid; how aid 
relationships should operate; and the emergence of new aid modalities (ibid.:76). The new emphasis 
on ‘partnerships’ and ‘ownership’ is not only rhetorical, but has resulted in a host of new aid 
programmes promising improved recipient-country ownership. Broadly speaking, these new 
programmes under the partnership era, were supposed to change the institutional relationship between 
donors and recipient-country governments, and allow aid recipients to have more say over the 
development policies that affect their daily lives (Swedlund, 2011). The introduction of the Poverty 
Reductions Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Budget support by the World Bank and the IMF2, are good 
examples of new aid modalities based on new practices to underpin the rhetoric on improved 
recipient-county ownership.   
Although the concept of ownership dominates the policy agenda, and consensus about the necessity 
of development being country owned has been achieved; there is little consensus about the definition 
of ownership and what it looks like in practice.  
                                                   
2 International Monetary Found (IMF) 
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The OECD’s3 statistical glossary defines ownership as, “[…] the effective exercise of a government’s 
authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially – 
on external resources” (OECD, 2007).  Whitfield and Fraser (2009) suggest that two contradictory 
concepts of ‘ownership’ coexist within development cooperation: ownership as commitment to 
policies, indifferent to how they were decided; and ownership as control over the processes and 
outcomes of choosing policies (ibid.3). Furthermore, Booth (2011) suggest an understanding of 
ownership linked to the concept of ‘political leadership’. The struggle over a clear-cut definition and 
the flexibility of the concept, render it a challenging analytically tool.  Swedlund (2011) suggests, 
that the most widespread understanding of the concept defines ownership as: a change in the 
institutional relationship between donors and recipient country governments (ibid.:26). This 
definition refers to ownership as a change in the ‘rules of the game’ that guide the interactions 
between donors and recipients. This definition links up to Whitfield and Fraser’s (2009) definition of 
ownership as control, where ownership represents a fundamental shift in the power relations between 
donors and recipient-country governments. It is this understanding of recipient-country ownership 
that this thesis relies on. Thus, improved recipient-country ownership is seen as, a change in the 
institutional relationship between donors and recipients, based on a shift in the power relations 
defining the interactions between donors and recipients in development cooperation.  
The Results-Agenda  
A lack of focus on results in previous aid modalities is understood as a major reason why past aid 
efforts have yielded disappointing results (Pearson, 2011:1). The strengthened focus on results in 
development cooperation, put forward by the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’, can be seen in the context 
of renewed scrutiny of international aid that threatens the creditability of development cooperation. 
A growing mistrust in development aid has intensified calls for accountability to taxpayers, and the 
need for results information to improve the planning and implementation of aid interventions 
(Vähämäki et. al. 2011:4). The results-agenda reintroduces the concept of ‘results-based 
management’ (RBM) in development cooperation (ibid.:15). Results-based management has been a 
managing tool in most public sectors of OECD countries since the early 1990’s, where the approach 
formed the basis for extensive public sector reforms to respond to economic, social and political 
pressures (ibid.). It is therefore not surprising that RBM has become part of the ‘development 
cooperation toolbox’.  
                                                   
3 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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Results-based management in development cooperation can be defined as: “A management strategy 
focusing on performance and achievement of output, outcomes and impact” (ibid.:7). RBM entails 
regular performance monitoring and dialogue between donors and recipients, based on determining 
performance measures, rather than budget prescriptions and programme activities (ibid.:16). In their 
extensive review on RBM in development cooperation, Vähämäki et.al. (2011) refer to Peter 
Drucker’s notion on RBM from 19544. Drucker emphasised learning as an important element of 
RBM, and discouraged the application of deterministic and mechanical models of results-based 
management. For Drucker a successful results orientation is a mind-set, rather than a precise set of 
instructions (Vähämäki et. al., 2011:12). Keeping Drucker’s understanding of results-based 
management in mind is important, when discussing the use of RBM in development cooperation 
today.  
Results-Based Aid  
The results-agenda has supported the emergence of a new group of results-based funding models, 
which have generated considerable interest in the development community. Results-based aid exist 
in all shapes and sizes and under many names; Results-based financing (RBF), Payment by Results 
(PbR, DFID5), Programming for Results (PforR, World Bank), Results-based aid (RBA) and Cash on 
Delivery aid (COD aid, Centre of Global Development). These different models, coined by different 
actors, are currently being tested in different development programmes as new approaches to aid 
management and aid delivery. However, this thesis takes its departure in the Results-based aid (RBA) 
modality, where the COD aid model is considered an ideal model for an RBA approach. Results-
based aid belongs to the family of partnership-based aid modalities and is defined as: 
“[…] a partnership between a development partner (donor) and a partner government 
(recipient). The main feature in this partnership is an introduction of an ex-post conditionality 
concept in the contract between both partners that defines incentives to produce measurable 
results. Aid disbursements or non-disbursement are directly linked to these independent verified 
measures of results.” (Klingebiel and Janus, 2014:5) 
The COD aid model is coined by the ‘Centre of Global Development’ in Washington.  
                                                   
4 Peter Drucker wrote a landmark paper within management theory in 1954 called The Practice of Management  
5 The Uk’s Department for International Development (DFID)  
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The COD aid model aims to fundamentally change the way foreign aid operates, in the funder-
recipient relationship and in the assignment of accountability, responsibility, and the focus of aid 
programmes (Birdsall et.al.,2010: 21). The results-based aid modality and the COD aid model is of 
key interest to this thesis, because the model strongly promotes its potential of fostering accountability 
through a results-based framework, while also building local ownership through a new approach to 
structuring the aid relationship.  
A Symbiotic Relationship?  
Based on a study of results-based aid programmes in Ghana and Tanzania, Heiner Janus (2014) 
argues, that a number of challenges occur during the implementation of results-based aid 
programmes. He suggests that a key challenge is a trade-off between recipient-country ownership and 
the results orientation. Vähämäki et.al. (2011) argue, based on their review of RBM in development 
cooperation, that there are recurrent and persistent problems linked to how donors apply RBM in 
practice. Most donors apply RBM in mechanistic models, as Peter Drucker warned against, instead 
of using the approach to improve accountability, learning and planning of aid programmes. Rosalind 
Eyben (2013) argues that results- and evidence discourses in development aid can turn useful tools 
and methods into coercive instruments, which reduce recipients’ space for choice, because of their 
hidden and invisible power to determine which type of knowledge counts (Eyben, 2013:3). Sceptics 
of results-based approaches to aid management, acknowledge the necessity for increased focus on 
achieving better development results. However, results-based aid approaches become ineffective, 
when they are applied in a way that allows donors to continuously control the development choices 
of recipients, and ensure that development in aid dependent countries follows their logic of ‘best 
practices’. Improved recipient-country ownership is dependent on donors’ willingness to relinquish 
some control of the development processes in recipient countries, and acknowledge the importance 
of local knowledge, and the capacity of recipients to design and implement the right policies and 
strategies to achieve development results.  Whether or not the introduction of results-based aid can 
help improve recipient-country ownership seems to be, based on the arguments above, dependent 
how donors apply the aid approach. Thus, to understand the relationship between the two core 
principles of the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’, we need to look at how donors design and implement 
results-based aid programmes.  
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The Research Objective   
The key objective of this thesis is to understand how results-based aid affects the degree of recipient-
country ownership. The approach to understand the relationship between ‘results-based aid’ and 
‘ownership’; is based on a study of the dynamics of the aid relationship in the partnership era of aid 
management. This research primarily focuses on the donor-side of the aid relationship, by studying 
how donors design and implement the aid modalities of the partnership era. This is not to argue; that 
improving recipient-country ownership is only the responsibility of donors, or that failing to improve 
recipient-country ownership is only a result of donor behaviour, and that recipient behaviour is of no 
relevance. Whitfield and Fraser (2009) argue that the degree of ownership recipients are able to 
achieve is constrained by the structural conditions faced by both donors and recipients when 
negotiating aid. However, this thesis is not about determining the degree of ownership in a specific 
country study, where donor and recipient conditions can be compared. It is about understanding the 
kind of behaviour and the mind-sets and power relations, which are produced and maintained in new 
aid modalities; and how these effect the degree of ownership enjoyed by aid recipients. The ‘degree’ 
of ownership should not be understood as an attempt to precisely measure ownership, but as a term 
used to signify a change in the power dynamics guiding the interactions between donors and 
recipients. This study of ownership is not based on an understanding of ownership as an achieved 
state of affairs, but as a desirable outcome (Booth, 2011). For improved recipient-country ownership 
to be an outcome of development cooperation, it is necessary to understand; how current aid practices 
impact upon the degree of ownership, and discuss the structures and mind-sets guiding interactions 
between donors and recipients within the current aid system.   
Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions.  
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1.2 Research Question  
How does the results-based aid modality impact upon the degree of recipient-country ownership, 
from a study of the dynamics of the aid relationship in the partnership era of aid management?    
1.2.2 Sub-questions  
§ Based on experiences from implementing partnership-based aid modalities, which barriers to 
improved recipient-country ownership can be identified?  
§ With regard to recipient-country ownership, how does the theoretical rationale characterising 
results-based aid and the COD aid model differ from previous aid modalities? 
§ Which implementation challenges with the Results-based aid and the COD aid model, can be 
identified from current experiences with implementing results-based aid programmes; and 
how does these challenges affect the modality’s potential of improving recipient-country 
ownership?  
§ In the partnership era, what bearing does the governmentality, shaping donor practices, have 
on the potential of new aid modalities changing the unequal power relations between donors 
and recipients?  
1.3 Clarification of Concepts   
Aid Modality  
In this thesis, the concept of aid modality is understood as a tool to transfer money; goods; and 
knowledge from developed to developing countries. The concept is equivalent to aid instrument, aid 
form or aid approach, which are also applied. An aid modality is not a development strategy per se, 
but it determines how funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient countries; and how recipients 
and donors interact in the process (Ohno & Niiya, 2004:3)   
Donors and Recipients  
The thesis does not actively distinguish between different types of donors (Bilateral, multilateral 
agencies, individual donor agencies, NGO’s, private individuals etc.). To simplify the concept of the 
aid relationship, donors are considered as a unified entity. However, it is acknowledged that there are 
different types of donors, and depending on the donor and the type of aid intervention, there will be 
different nuances to the aid relationship.  
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These risk being overlooked when conceptualising donors as a unified entity. The same argument 
applies to some extent to the concept of recipients. However, in the aid modalities analysed, recipient 
refers primarily to the government of the recipient-country.  
Partnership era  
This thesis borrows the notion of the partnership era from Whitfield and Fraser (2009). The 
partnership era refers to a change in the thinking about the aims of aid; how aid relationships should 
operate; and the emergence of new aid modalities. In this thesis, the concept furthermore refers to a 
change in the discourses characterising the aid relationship – this is a change from conceiving the aid 
relationship as a ‘donor/recipient’ relationship, to a relationship between ‘partner countries’.  
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2. Methodology  
This chapter seeks to present the methodological approach to the selection and treatment of data and 
its application to the analytical framework of this thesis. It furthermore presents the research’s 
position within philosophy of science; substantiate the choice of theories and present the analysis 
strategy and design.    
2.1 Methodological Approach  
The thesis employ a qualitative research method to study how the results-based aid modality affects 
the degree of recipient-country ownership. While quantitative research designs are important, these 
designs are not useful for obtaining detailed information about the context in which events or 
behaviours occur (O’Sullivan et.al., 2008:38). The objective of this thesis is to understand how the 
dynamics of the aid relationship, in the partnership era, affects the behaviour of donors; and how this 
behaviour effects the potential for new aid modalities to improve the degree of recipient-country 
ownership. To achieve this aim, I believe it is more useful to speak the language of cases and contexts, 
than a language of variables and hypotheses (Neuman, 2011:165). The objective is not to test the 
relationship between results-based aid and ownership, but to generate new perspectives on the 
challenges of improving recipient-country ownership. This is done by identifying and describing 
causal mechanisms and processes for a narrow set of cases, which fit the research objective. The 
qualitative researcher is expected to draw on multiple sources of evidence, that is, to seek convergence 
and corroboration through different data sources and methods (Bowen, 2009:28). In the following 
section, I seek to present my methods for data selection and data treatment.  
2.1.1 Data Selection and Treatment  
“Documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and 
discover insights relevant to the research problem.” (Bowen, 2009:29)  
This study relies on the documentary research method or document analysis method, which implies 
analysing documents that contain information relevant to the subject of a given study. “Document 
analysis requires that data are examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain 
understanding and develop empirical knowledge” (Bowen, 2009:27). The document analysis method 
is often used in combination with other qualitative research methods. However, there are some 
examples of the method standing on its own (ibid.:29).  
10 
 
The analysis of this thesis does not solely rely on analysing documents, but is supplemented by a 
qualitative interview with William Savedoff from the Centre of Global Development. However, the 
analysis does largely rely on analysing documents, because there are extensive data material available 
from the research field on foreign aid and development cooperation. Yet, on the subject of results-
based aid and especially the Cash on Delivery aid model, there are limited empirical data available. 
Here, the qualitative interview serves the purpose of ‘filling the gaps’, to ensure that the analytical 
conclusions a sufficiently supported.  
In this thesis, ‘documents’ refer to; scientific articles, books, synthesis reports, country studies, 
literature reviews and graphic illustrations/models. Document analysis method requires data 
selection instead of data collection (Bowen, 2009:31). This means that the data sources applied in 
this thesis, have been carefully selected based on reviewing and evaluating the available data within 
the scope of the research question. Even though documents can be a rich source of data, it is necessary 
review the documents from a critical perspective before incorporating them in a study. Thus, the 
usability of all selected data sources have been assessed based on Bowen’s (2009) four criteria of 
quality: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.   
2.1.2 Data Triangulation  
“By triangulating data, the researcher attempts to provide ‘a confluence of evidence that breeds 
credibility’.” (Bowen, 2009:28) 
Within social research, there is a common understanding that we learn more by observing from 
multiple perspectives than by looking from a single perspective (Neuman, 2011:164).  In this thesis, 
data triangulation is a useful method, because the perspectives studied such as the different aid 
modalities of the partnership era, have been analysed and discussed from multiple perspectives since 
their emergence. There are several types of data triangulation (ibid.), but this thesis relies on 
triangulation of observers. Each observer of the same phenomenon, event or behaviour, may notice 
and record different data. Combining the observations and experiences of different researchers, will 
produce a fuller picture, rather than relying on a single observer (ibid.:166).  
The first part of the analysis contains a study of the relationship between ownership and budget 
support and the PRSP approach, respectively.  This study is based upon several data sources, which 
present different observations on the modalities, both objectively and critically, and from different 
perspectives.  
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Some of the observers have studied the modalities from the perspective of a specific topic, in this 
case conditionality (Mold, 2009: Killick, 2006: Dricoll & Evans, 2005). Others employ a more critical 
framework, based on theoretical assumptions of the power relations embedded in the new modalities 
(Joseph, 2010b: Hyden, 2008). While a final group of observers base their observations on extensive 
and in-depth country studies of both a qualitative and quantitative nature (Swedlund, 2013: 
Cheru:2006: Booth:2008: Hayman 2009). Common to all these studies are, that they all either 
intentionally or unintentionally record observations relevant to the concept of recipient-country 
ownership. Thus, the results derived from the analysis are obtained through a process of identifying 
these observations and putting them to analytical use.  
The second part of the analysis studies the relationship between ownership and the results-based aid 
modality. This study presented some data related challenges. The effects of the results-based aid 
modality on aid effectiveness and ownership are relatively uncharted. There are several types of 
results-based approaches to aid management currently being tested in different aid programmes by 
different actor. However, this thesis narrows the research scope to aid programmes, which fit under 
the definition of results-based aid as presented in the chapter on ‘results-based aid and the COD aid 
model’, and which additionally come as close as possibly to the COD aid model. Thus, the results of 
the second analysis part is based on relatively few data sources, but the data applied are more focused 
on the relationship of interest. Moreover, the results identified here rely to a larger extent on 
perspectives revealed from applying the theoretical framework to the empirical data. The analysis 
relies primarily on data from an extensive review of results-based aid programmes, conducted by Rita 
Perakis and William Savedoff in 2015; and a written interview conducted by me with the same 
William Savedoff6.   
The interview with Mr. Savedoff is treated as an expert source on the concepts of results-based aid 
and the COD aid model. He is a senior fellow at the Centre for Global Development and conducts 
research on issues of aid effectiveness; he furthermore co-authored the book on Cash on Delivery aid. 
Savedoff contributes to the analysis with in-depth knowledge and relevant perspectives on result-
based aid, and the implementation challenges related to the COD aid model.  
The interview was conducted as a written interview, due to the geographical distance between 
Copenhagen and Washington DC and a busy schedule.  
                                                   
6 This decisions is further elaborated on in section 5.2.4  
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A written interview is not the optimal way of conducting a qualitative interview, because the 
interviewer is prevented from going into depth with the respondent’s answers, and getting the 
respondent to expand on their answers on the spot (Patton, 2002:21). However, this form of 
qualitative interview is still applicable given that, “[…] open-ended responses on questionnaires 
represent the most elementary form of qualitative data” (ibid.). Thus, the interview can be viewed as 
a questionnaire consisting only of open-ended questions. The interview was part of a longer e-mail 
correspondence with Mr. Savedoff, which allowed me to request that he expanded on those of his 
answers, which I found particular relevant for the scope of the analysis. The initial interview and 
additional responses are enclosed in Appendix b.  
Additional interviews with relevant actors engaged in the results-based aid research field would have 
been a strength to the analysis. Additional interviews were on the drawing board in the initial research 
design, but were dropped after unsuccessful contact attempts. However, I believe that the two sources 
combined, and the supporting theoretical framework provides a valid and reliable data foundation for 
understanding the potentials and challenges of implementing results-based aid programmes; and 
provides in-depth perspectives on the relationship between ownership and results-based aid.  
The third part of the analysis contains a study of the power relations guiding the interactions between 
donors and recipients in the partnership era. This study also relies on a triangulation of data, though, 
the analysis is mostly based on the theoretical perspective of governmentality theory. The final 
analysis includes perspectives from observers studying the power relations of development 
partnerships from perspectives that differ empirically, but are theoretically convergent, and aligns 
with the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
2.2 Philosophy of Science  
The research of the thesis is positioned within the social constructivist paradigm of philosophy of 
science. The research is based on the acknowledgement, that reality to a large extent is marked and 
formed by our realisation of it (Rasborg, 2009:349). A focal point of this thesis is the aid relationship, 
which is understood as a socially constructed phenomenon, meaning its genesis is a result of historical 
and social processes. The study of the aid relationship is absorbed with understanding, how 
innovations in aid modalities change or effect the construction of the aid relationship, in this case, 
based on the notion of ‘ownership’. The social constructivist paradigm contains a perspective on 
change, which aligns with the paradigms ontological premise, that social reality is constructed by the 
knowledge and practices of regular actors (ibid.).  
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Thus, if the aid relationship is constructed through human actions, it can be changed through human 
actions. The notion of human actions is central to the research scope of this thesis. This is because, 
on a more general level, this thesis is about understanding donor behaviour within the current aid 
system, and shed some light on the challenges of changing these behaviours. 
 Berger and Luckman (1966) argue:  
“ [… ] all socially constructed universes change, and the change is brought about by the concrete 
actions of human beings. [… ]Reality is socially defined, but the definitions are always 
embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality. To 
understand the state of the socially constructed universe at any given time, or its change over 
time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining.” 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966:134)   
Thus, this research is based on the realisation, that to understand the state of the current aid 
relationship it is necessary to take into consideration the context the actors operate within. Moreover, 
the context which new aid modalities is implemented in or ‘born into’ is understood based on Berger 
and Luckman’s (1966) notions of externalisation, objectivation and internalisation (ibid.:78). Human 
activity has produced the reality that results-based aid programmes are sought implemented in. Here, 
the structures and institutions are created and reproduced through habits, routines and interpretations, 
which develop through every day interactions between actors in the aid system (externalisation). Over 
time these institutional formations takes a more permanent form – or in other words, they are 
objectified.  It is in this pre-established institutional framework new aid modalities are ‘born into’, 
which are constituted on basic norms and values that the aid modality are to internalise. The 
construction of reality is according to Berger and Luckman a continuing dialectical process, where 
reality is influenced by human actions and human actions are influenced by reality (ibid.78). Thus, in 
order to understand how results-based aid effects the degree of recipient-country ownership, based 
on current implementation experiences, it is necessary to take into account how the aid modality seeks 
to change reality, and how reality acts back on the modality.  
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2.3 Choice of Theory  
Given that there is not one theoretical perspective that can support the research objectives of this 
thesis, the method of theory triangulation is necessary to establish an adequate theoretical framework. 
Triangulation of theory is applicable when the interpretation of data requires multiple theoretical 
perspectives. Each perspective guides the study, by identifying relevant data; providing a set of 
concepts: and help interpret the meaning and significance of data (Neuman, 2011:166) The 
overriding objective, which have determined the choice of theoretical framework, is to understand 
and explain the behaviour of donors and the motives behind their actions. In order to make the 
framework more manageable, the different theories are paired in two sub-chapters. The objectives 
and content of the two sub-chapters are presented below, and a more in-depth operationalisation of 
the individual theories can be found in the theoretical framework in chapter 3.  
The first sub-chapter is composed by Governmentality theory and the Principal-Agent Model. These 
theories seek to provide relevant theoretical perspectives to understand the dynamics of the 
relationship between donors and recipients, within aid modalities that conceive the aid relationship 
as a partnership. Foucault’s notions on power relations and his work on governmentality theory, 
provide the theoretical foundation for understanding the power relations and practices of government, 
which shape the dynamics of the aid relationship in the current aid system. The theory presentation 
is not based on Foucault’s own work on power and governmentality, due to the magnitude and 
complexity of the material published by Foucault on the subjects. To be able to extract the data 
relevant to the research scope of this thesis, and to save time, the presentation relies on secondary 
data sources, which have been acknowledge for their contributions on the subjects. The use of 
governmentality theory is limited to Mitchell Dean’s (1999) conceptualisation of the analytics of 
government and the governmentality of advanced liberal government. These concepts are more 
relevant for understanding donor practices in the partnership-based aid modalities, than other aspects 
of governmentality theory, also presented by Dean (1999). Thus, the theoretical framework does not 
go into detail with the processes and the other government rationalities, which have led to the 
emergence of advanced liberal government.   
The Principal-Agent model serves two main purposes. First, it provides a model for understanding 
the dynamics of the aid relationship, when the interactions between donors and recipients are based 
on a contractual relationship, which applies to the three analysed aid modalities. Secondly, the model 
contributes with perspectives on how actors in a principal-agent relationship are expected to behave. 
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The principal-agent model is a part of larger framework on incentive theory. Even though the analysis 
touches upon the subject of incentive structures, I have chosen not to expand on the use of incentive 
theory beyond the notion of the Principal-Agent model. This is because the main interest of this thesis 
relates to the relational perspectives incentive theory provides, and not the technical perspectives on 
how to use economic incentives to guide the behaviour of actors.  
The second sub-chapter presents Kjell Arne Røvik’s contribution to Translation theory and James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen’s theory of the Logics of Action. These theories seek to provide theoretical 
perspectives on how we can understand and interpret the behaviour of donors; identified in the 
analysis of the experiences from current attempts of donors to design and implement results-based 
aid programmes. Røvik’s (2009) research in is concerned with the supply, transfer, demand, 
implementation and exploitation of organisational ideas and models in the 21st century. This thesis 
limits the application of Røvik’s research to his theoretical contribution to translation studies. Røvik’s 
theory provides interesting perspectives on the motives donors can have for altering key features of 
results-based aid. It furthermore provides an explanatory foundation for how donors chose to 
transform organisational ideas, when transferred form one context to another. The use of Røvik’s 
translation theory is limited to a few central concepts.  
The application of March and Olsen’s theory of the Logics of Action should be understood, as a 
continuation of the perspectives provided by Røvik. March and Olsen have conducted extensive 
research within the field of institutional- and organisational theory. Their concept of logics of action 
is central to their theoretical work on organisational behaviour. This thesis applies the concept of 
logics of action to explain, from an institutional perspective, why donors behave in the manner they 
do, during the design- and implementation phase of results-based aid programmes. March and Olsen 
are furthermore known for their contributions to implementation theory. Even though the analysis of 
donor behaviour takes it departure from an implementation process, I find that traditional 
implementation theory, which goes into more detail with the implementation process, does not fit the 
research scope of this thesis.  
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2.4 Analysis Strategy  
The analysis of this thesis aims to establish a thorough understanding of the challenges of improving 
recipient-country ownership through new aid modalities. The key interest is to understand, how one 
of the latest innovations within aid management and aid delivery, results-based aid, impact upon the 
degree of recipient-country ownership. The results-based aid modality have emerged from the current 
period within development cooperation, which this thesis refers to as the partnership era. Thus, the 
introduction of the results-based aid modality is seen as part of a larger framework of significant 
changes within development cooperation, involving new aid practices and visions for how the aid 
relationship should operate. Therefore, the scope of the analysis moves beyond the study of results-
based aid, to enable a discussion on current trends within the aid system and their potential to improve 
recipient-country ownership. The analysis is divided into three sub-chapters, which represent 
different key objectives aligned with the research interest of this thesis. The analysis design is 
illustrated in figure 1.0.    
Figure 1.0: Analysis design 
  
Barriers to Ownership 
in the Partnership Era
Theme:
The relationship between 
'ownership' and 
PRSP/Budget support 
Objective:                  
Identify the barriers to 
improving recipient-country 
ownership, based upon 
donor practices in the aid 
modalities of the partnership 
era
Improving Ownership 
Through Results-Based 
Aid 
Theme:
The relationship between 
'ownership' and Results-
based aid / COD aid 
model
Objective:                
Illustrate how the desing and 
implementation of RBA 
programmes effect the 
modality's theoretical 
rationale for improving 
ownership  
The Power of 
Development 
Partnerships 
Theme: 
The power relations 
defining the aid 
relationship in the 
partnership era 
Objective:                 
Establish how the 
governmentality shaping 
donor practices in  
development partnerships 
effect power relations in the 
aid relationship  
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3. Theoretical Framework  
The following chapter seeks to introduce the theoretical framework that underpins the analytical 
work of this thesis. The individual theories are operationalised in greater detail at the end of each 
theory presentation.  
3.1 The Aid Relationship – Dynamics of Power and Control     
3.1.1 Governmentality Theory  
Foucault’s Governmentality theory is part of an extensive framework on power and rule in modern 
society; and has been applied for multiple research purposes since its conception. Jonathan Joseph 
argues the inherent danger of the concept of governmentality is that it becomes a catchall category, 
which can be applied far too generally (Joseph 2010a:226). To avoid presenting the theoretical 
insights and analytical use of the concept as either, too general or too complex, my use and 
understanding of the concept primarily relies on Foucault’s notion of power, and the work of Mitchell 
Dean (1999) on the practices of government in the neo-liberal governmentality of advanced liberal 
government. 
A Foucauldian Perspective on Power  
Governmentality theory has its roots in Foucault’s analytics of power. Foucault’s conceptualisation 
of power separates itself from Robert Dahl’s more classic formulation, which defines power, as the 
ability of A to get B to do what B would not otherwise do. Power in this definition is coercive and 
intentional, leading to observable behavioural change in its target population (Abrahamsen, 2004). 
Foucault argues against a definition of power as something you possess; “Power is not something 
that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away” (Flyvbjerg, 
2000:105). Foucault’s study of power is not about power in itself, but about studying power relations. 
As noted by Flyvbjerg (2000), from a Foucauldian perspective, the important questions to ask about 
power is not ‘why’, ‘where’ or ‘what’, but ‘how’ power is exercised (ibid.).  
Foucault discusses relations of power primarily as productive rather than repressive. Power works 
through production, because fundamentally, power represents the ability of individuals to choose and 
to act on those choices. Freedom is the condition for exercising power, and according to Foucault, 
power does not delimit action by force, but by constraining the free choices of individuals, through 
discursive processes of demarcating legitimate choices from illegitimate ones (Ove 2013:313). 
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Government from this perspective becomes an activity, which shapes the field of actions, and thus 
attempt to shape freedom (Dean 1999:13).  
Foucault defines government as ‘conduct of conduct’. Dean expands on Foucault’s definition by 
defining government as:  
”… any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and 
agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge that seeks to shape conduct by 
working through our desires, aspirations, interest and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with 
a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.” (Dean 1999:11)  
According to Dean, if you seek to analyse government, you need to analyse the practices that try to 
shape, sculpt, mobilise and work, through choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of 
individuals and groups (ibid:21). The practices that are of particular interest to this thesis are the 
government practices that Dean conceptualises under the term ‘advanced liberal government’.  
Advanced Liberal Government  
“…advanced liberal government endeavours not only work through the various forms of freedom and 
agency of individuals and collectives, but also deploy indirect means for surveillance and regulation 
of the agency.” (Dean 1999:149) 
The subjection of the free subject is a condition of freedom. In order to act freely, the subject must 
first be shaped, guided and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom through 
systems of domination (ibid.:165). Advanced liberal government works through a multiplicity of 
‘practices of liberty’. This means that on the one hand they, contact, consult, negotiate, create 
partnerships; they even empower and activate forms of agency, liberty and the choices of individuals, 
consumers, professionals, households, neighbourhoods and communities. On the other hand, they set 
norms, standards, benchmarks, performance indicators, quality controls and best practices standards; 
to monitor, measure and render calculable the performance of these various agencies (ibid.). 
Dean points to several features of advanced liberal government, which are important to pay attention 
to, the ‘new prudentialism’, ‘technologies of agency’ and ‘technologies of performance’ (ibid.:166). 
However, for the purpose of this research, only the features of technologies of agency and 
technologies of performance are found relevant to the analytical objectives.   
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Technologies of agency are technologies of government, which seek to enhance or deploy the 
possibilities of agency. According to Dean, there are two broad types of technologies of agency: 
‘Contractualisation’ and ‘Technologies of citizenship’. Contractualisation refers to the use of 
contracts to govern the relationship between those who govern and those being governed. 
Technologies of citizenship are techniques of self-esteem; of empowerment and of consultation; and 
negotiation aimed at engaging individuals as free citizens, informed and responsible consumers, 
members of self-managing communities and organisations, and as agents capable of taking control 
of their own risks. (ibid.:168)  
Technologies of performance are plural technologies of government, designed to foster new 
calculative regimes of government. Technologies of performance include, the setting of performance 
indicators, benchmarking, devolution of budgets, corporatisation and privatisation of formerly public 
services. All of these are more or less technical means of ensuring the moral and political 
requirements for shaping conduct into optimisation of performance. Technologies of performance 
present themselves as techniques to restore trust between the involved actors. However, they 
presuppose a culture of mistrust in professions and institutions that they themselves produce, intensify 
and contribute to (ibid.:169).  
The technologies of agency and performance constitute the foundation of ‘government at a distance’. 
Technologies of agency establish self-managing centres, which are to be self-regulating and made 
accountable by the technologies of performance (ibid.170).  
Governmentality Theory and the Aid Relationship   
Dean’s (1999) account of advanced liberal government present a perspective on how control and 
power take place through the freedom of those being governed. The study of governmentality is in its 
original framework about power and rule in modern society, with the relationship between the state 
and its citizens as the main object of interest. The power relationship of primary interest in this thesis 
is not one between a state and its citizens, but between donors and recipients. Under the term global 
governmentality, recent studies of governmentality have moved outside the traditional scope of nation 
states, and extended Foucault’s thoughts toward exploring the governance of the global, the 
international, the regional and many other extra-domestic spaces (Larner and Walters 2004). Joseph 
(2010a) provides us with a conceptualisation of global governmentality, based on how international 
organisations seek to regulate the conduct of states through neoliberal practices.  
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Joseph (2010a) argues that if we wish to apply governmentality theory to the global level, the 
processes of governing must not be seen as targeting populations, but as processes governing the 
behaviour of states. 
This thesis seeks to analyse the governmentality shaping donor practices in partnership-based aid 
modalities, and discuss the power relationship they maintain or produce. The technologies of agency 
and performance are applied to analyse the relationship between recipient-country ownership and 
results-based aid. This is based on the understanding that both technologies constitute key features of 
the results-based aid approach. Governmentality theory provides a foundation for explaining, why 
the aid modalities of the partnership era fall short in their aim of improving recipient-country 
ownership.  
3.1.2 Principal-Agent Model  
The Principal-Agent model characterises a relationship between a principal and an agent, where the 
principal tries to encourage the agent to behave in a certain way using economic incentives. Professor 
Stephen A. Ross describes the relationship between principal and agent as:  
“[...] an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as 
the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a 
particular domain of decision problems.” (Ross, 1973: 1)   
The model considers the question of how to design a contract that embodies a structure of rewards 
and penalties, which make it in one party’s interest to act in ways that further another party’s utility, 
and which punishes deviations from that course (Whitfield, 2009:34).  The model assumes that both 
the agent and the principal are rational actors, motivated to act in their own best interest. The theory 
assumes that the agent wishes to pursue his own economic interests and receive the greatest possible 
reward for as little effort as possible, while the principal tries to design the incentive structures to 
ensure the greatest possible return on the agent’s efforts. The theory prescribes that the principal’s 
success of achieving maximum utility of the relationship depends on the control the principal has 
over the agent. Control can be ensured through a contract that determines the conditions for the 
collaboration; however, to design such a contract encompasses different challenges (Andersen et. al., 
2010: 12-14).     
The challenges arise due to a difference of interest between the actors, and the issue of imperfect or 
asymmetric information.  
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By default, the agent benefits from an information advantage over the principal: “[...] by definition 
the agent has been selected for his specialized knowledge and the principal can never hope to 
completely check the agent’s performance” (Laffont and Martimort, 2002: 12).  
This means that the agent can behave in an opportunistic manner, which Williamson (1985) defines 
as:  
“[…] includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and cheating. 
Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit. Both active and passive forms and 
both ex ante and ex post types are included. [...] More generally, opportunism refers to the 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” (Williamson, 1985: 47)  
Asymmetric information can cause the agent to exercise opportunistic behaviour in two ways: 
”[...] either the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal, the case of moral hazard 
or hidden action; or the agent has some private information about its cost or valuation that is 
ignored by the principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge.” (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002:12) 
Adverse selection or hidden knowledge can be seen as pre-contractual opportunistic behaviour on 
behalf of the agent, made possible by asymmetric information (ibid.: 37). Moral Hazard or hidden 
action, on the other hand, is post-contractual opportunism. Because the agent has more information 
about his actions and intentions he might take an action unobservable by the principal, which is - by 
the principal -  viewed as inappropriate due to the conflict of objectives between the principal and the 
agent (ibid.:147).   
The fundamental challenge of asymmetric information, and the ways in which the agent can exercise 
opportunistic behaviour, mean that the relationship between the principal and the agent often is 
marked by a high degree of mistrust. In addition, the possibility for agents to exercise opportunistic 
behaviour furthers the need for the principal to strengthen control and supervision.  It is important to 
stress that adverse selection and moral hazard are not an issue if the principal and agent have the same 
objectives. However, the theory predicts that conflicting objectives often exist in a principal-agent 
relationship and thus the objective of the theory is to establish how to overcome principal-agent 
problems caused by asymmetric information. Overcoming principal-agent problems theoretically 
requires designing the right contracts and getting the incentives right.  
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Principal-Agent Theory and the Aid Relationship  
Relationships between donors and recipients are most often analysed from a principal-agent 
perspective, which naturally makes the model relevant for the research of this thesis. The model can 
be used descriptively to outline the nature of the relationship between a donor (the principal) and the 
recipient (the agent). Moreover, it can be used analytically to explain the behaviour of principals and 
agents when they enter into a contractual relationship, guided by certain incentive structures. The 
model serves both purposes in the analytical work of this thesis. The principal-agent model, and the 
notion of principal-agent problems, provide a basis for understanding the behaviour of donors and 
recipients in the aid modalities analysed, which are all based on contracts. In connection with results-
based aid, the principal-agent model is applied with the objective of analysing how the framework 
and key features of the modality seek to reduce the risk of recipient-governments behaving 
opportunistically. The principal-agent model is not the only way to understand and analyse the aid 
relationship, and it is not necessarily the most relevant perspective to apply in an analysis of results-
based aid (see Perakis and Savedoff, 2015:8). However, elements of the principal-agent model 
continues to have bearing on a relationship between two actors based on unequal power relations, 
where issues of divergent objectives and imperfect information characterise their interactions.  
3.2 Understanding Donor Behaviour  
3.2.1 Translation Theory  
Kjell Arne Røvik (2009) draws upon notions from the academic field of ‘translation studies’ in a 
metaphorical sense, to analyse and understand how organisational models are transferred from one 
context to another. The translation perspective looks at the possibilities and ways in which ideas are 
transferred between organisations, and with time, are realised in the practices of the adopting 
organisation (Røvik, 2009:249). Røvik’s perspectives on translation theory can be seen as a 
conceptualisation of the possibilities and the limitations linked to the process of transferring 
knowledge and ideas between different organisational contexts. In the following, I seek to present 
some of the theory’s central theoretical assumptions, which I find relevant to the analysis of current 
experiences with the implementation of results-based aid models.  
Translation Motives  
According to Røvik, a translation is not just a translation but more likely a reproduction of ideas, or 
in some instances a whole new production (Røvik, 2009:257). It is possible to distinguish between 
intentional and unintentional translation motives.  
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When translations are intentional, Røvik identifies three motives for translating organisational ideas. 
First, the motive for translating an organisational model can be seen as a deliberate and rational 
decision to produce a ‘local version’ of the model, with the objective of ensuring that the model 
becomes an effective instrument for increasing effectiveness and the results of the adapting 
organisation. A second motive for translation occurs in a context of conflicting interest, conflicts and 
negotiations, which triggers or drives the translation of a model in a specific direction. Under such 
circumstances, the model is translated to a “new” version that does not challenge the interests and 
preferences of the adapting organisation to the same degree as the ‘original’ model would have. A 
third motive for translation can be motivated by an unspoken objective of achieving symbolic and/or 
status-related effects. Here the translation seeks to increase the reputation of the adapting organisation 
as a modern and responsible actor. (ibid.:255-256) 
Rules of Translation  
Røvik’s theory seeks to identify and describe possible patterns and rules of translation based on two 
concepts: decontextualisation and contextualisation. For the purposes of this thesis, the concept of 
contextualisation is more relevant to the analysis of how donors translate and transform the core 
features of the results-based aid modality during the implementation phase. Thus, I will only go into 
further detail with the concept of contextualisation.    
The concept of contextualisation covers the process of translating ideas that to some degree represent 
practices from a specific context, and introducing them to a new organisational context. This context 
will, as a rule, be complex and consist of physical-materialistic structures, formal structures, routines, 
procedures and some invisible cultures. Moreover, there will be individuals working in this context 
with certain identities and knowledge, which employ already established procedures and instruments 
to perform their tasks. In addition to this, there will be more or less obvious conflicts of interest 
(Røvik, 2009:293). From the contextualisation concept Røvik identifies translation- and 
transformation rules, which present an understanding of, how ideas through translations are 
transformed to fit a new and local setting, and, which liberties translators have and take when ideas 
are translated from one context to another (ibid.:301)   
Translation- and transformation rules cover different degrees of transformation depending on the 
approach employed in the translation. The different degrees of transformation and approaches to 
translation also reveal the liberties the translator have and take when transforming the ideas through 
translation (ibid.:305-307). 
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Røvik identifies four translation rules, which comply with three models of transformation, ranging 
from none or a weak degree of transformation to a significant degree of transformation. The first 
model of transformation is the reproducing state of translation. Here the rule of copying applies to 
the translation process. This model prescribes that organisations and translators try to reproduce and 
recreate the organisational ideas as accurate as possible, when they are translated into a different 
context. The success of copying depends on how translatable and transferrable the ideas are 
(ibid.:308).  
The second model of transformation is the modified state of translation. Here the rules of addition 
and subtraction applies to the translation process. In this model, organisations and translators will try 
to balance the considerations for the integrity of the original idea, with the need to adjust the idea to 
a new context. Therefore, elements are added, subtracted and toned down (ibid.:311). The process of 
transforming ideas through addition and subtraction can occur through a rational-strategical 
approach, where the transformation of the idea is based on relatively clear intentions and instrumental 
calculations. The process can also occur as a more unintended approach, where small transformations 
happen, which are not based on rational intensions or calculations. This approach is seen as a 
consequence of organisations and translators having limited time to fully comprehend the practices 
and ideas of the organisational model they wish to adopt (ibid.311-314).  
The final model of transformation is the radical state of translation, where the rule of conversion is 
applied to the translation process. The third model asserts that the ideas and practices of an 
organisational model that is transferred to a new organisational context, are only used as an inspiration 
to develop new local models (ibid.:315).  
Translation theory and Donor Behaviour  
Røvik’s translation theory constitutes the theoretical foundation for analysing the behaviour of donors 
when implementing results-based aid programmes. A key challenge for testing the effects a results-
based aid model, such as the COD aid model, have on recipient-country ownership, is that the model 
has not yet been implemented in its intended form (See Appendix b; Perakis and Savedoff, 2015). 
The second part of the analysis seeks to analyse how donors alter or ‘translate’ some of the key 
features of the COD aid model to fit their notions of how aid should be managed.  
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Røvik’s theory provides the theoretically tools to explain how donors go about translating the results-
based aid modality, and the COD aid model, and to some extent explain why they choose to translate 
and transform the models. To expand on the notion of why donors translate and transform key features 
of the results-based aid modality, I will apply March and Olsen’s theory on the ‘logics of action’.  
3.2.2 Logics of Action  
J.G March and J.P Olsen address issues of organisational behaviour from an institutionalist 
perspective. An institution is defined as:  
“[…] organisational arrangements that link roles/identities, accounts of situations, resources 
and prescriptive rules and practices. They create actors and meeting places and organize the 
relations and interactions among actors. They guide behaviour and stabilize expectations. 
Institutions, furthermore, allocate resources and empower and constrain actors differently and 
make them more or less capable of acting according to prescribed rules.” (March & Olsen, 
2009:5) 
March and Olsen’s research belongs to the school of thought of sociological institutionalism, which 
takes it departure from the notion that organisations follow certain rules, and that actions are 
determined by specific organisational procedures (March & Olsen, 1989:21).  March and Olsen work 
with the notions of the ‘logics of action’, which is made up by the concepts of logic of consequentiality 
and logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2009).  Logic of consequentiality understands 
individual behaviour as governed by consequence and rationality. It assumes that individual action 
depends on the answers to three questions:  What are the alternatives? What are the consequences 
that will follow from each alternative? What is the value, in terms of preferences of the decision 
maker, of the consequences? (March & Olsen 1995:7). 
Logic of consequentiality assumes that decisions are purely based on self-interest and that behavioural 
decisions are made on a foundation, where all alternatives and their consequences are known, which 
enables actors to identify optimal decisions. Thus, a logic of consequentiality presupposes rational 
behaviour and the notion that organisations have consistent and clear preferences (March and Olsen, 
1995:12-13).  
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Logic of appropriateness on the other hand, is an institutional perspective built around ideas of 
identities and conceptions of appropriate behaviour. This logic assumes that individual action depends 
on the answers to three entirely different questions: What kind of person am I? What kind of situation 
is this? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this? (March & Olsen 1995:7) 
Appropriateness is a cognitive concept, where actions are based on reasoning about what the 
individual conceives as appropriate, and what is expected of the individual on the basis institutional 
identity (March & Olsen 1995:31–32). Thus, action are driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary 
behaviour. In this context, rules are defined as:  
“[…]routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies 
[…] beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate, and 
contradict those roles and routines.” (March & Olsen 1989: 22) 
Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to 
fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership of a political community or 
group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institution (March & Olsen, 2009:4).  
Olsen (2007) emphasises that rules guide behaviour and make some actions more likely than others, 
although they do not determine political behaviour or policy outcomes precisely. Rules, laws, 
identities and institutions provide parameters for action rather than dictate specific actions. This 
presupposes that actors to some extent must be able to make rational decisions. Even though the logic 
of appropriateness represents an alternative perspective to the logic of consequentiality, choice 
among rules and among alternative interpretations of rules is determined by a consequential logic 
(March & Olsen, 1989:25).    
Logics of Action and Donor Behaviour  
The use of March and Olsen’s theory on the ‘logics of action’ aligns with the objectives of Røvik’s 
‘translation theory’. This theory constitutes the foundation for explaining why donors choose to alter 
or translate key features of the COD aid model. Analysing the behaviour of donors from the 
perspective of institutional theory provides an understanding of why it is so difficult to generate 
behavioural change. The COD aid model challenges donors, because it challenges the conventional 
aid-relationship that has been built and sustained for more than half a century, and serves many 
interests.  
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Thus, understanding that donor behaviour can be explained from an institutionalist perspective on 
how donors follow certain rules, and how their actions are determined by specific organisational 
procedures. This perspective offers a relevant explanation as to why donors are challenge by some of 
the key features of a results-based aid approach. 
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4. Results-Based Aid  
Results-based approaches to aid management refer to different programmes from different actors. 
Therefore, it is possible to identify variations in the concrete frameworks of the individual 
approaches. However, in the following chapter, I seek to present an overall conceptualisation of 
results-based aid, mainly based on Klingebiel and Janus’s (2014) extensive review on the potentials 
and limitations of results-based aid in development cooperation. A more detailed account of the 
mechanisms and procedures of results-based aid is presented in the presentation of the COD aid 
model.  
4.1 Understanding Results-Based Aid  
Klingebiel and Janus define RBA as, a partnership between a development partner (donor) and a 
partner government (recipient). The main feature in this partnership is an introduction of an ex-post 
conditionality concept in the contract between both partners that defines incentives to produce 
measurable results. Aid disbursements or non-disbursements are directly linked to independent 
verified measures of results (Klingebiel and Janus, 2014:5).  
Results-based aid is part of a big family of results-based financing approaches. RBA differs from 
other types of result-based financing because, RBA funding is based on a contract between a donor 
and a national government (Pearson, 2011: 3).The main characteristic of an RBA approach is the link 
between the aid intervention and the strong incentives to encourage results. This link is based on 
payments for results (outcomes), and not payments for inputs. Figure 2.0 illustrates the results chain 
to clarify the differences between paying for inputs and paying for outcome.  
Figure 2.0: Own model based on Batliner et. al. (2011) 
 
THE RESULTS CHAIN
Implementation Results 
Inputs	 Activities Outputs	 Outcomes Impact
Effects
Financial, 
human           
and material 
resources 
Tasks and 
actions untaken 
to transform 
inputs to 
outputs
Products and 
services 
delivered 
Direct effects 
on 
beneficiaries 
Lasting 
changes in the 
lives of 
beneficiaries  
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A key feature of the RBA modality is that the disbursement of aid will only happen when recipients 
deliver on predefined outcomes/results. This means, that recipients are expected to be able to pre-
finance the inputs and activities necessary for the delivery of the results.   
As the definition by Klingebiel and Janus (2014) reveals, RBA is based on the notion of ex-post 
conditionality, which differs from previous generations of ex-ante policy conditionality. Ex-post 
conditionality represents a switch from disbursing aid against pre-specified menus of policy change, 
to the allocation of aid based on periodic overall assessment of government results. Ideally, 
conditionality in the context of an RBA approach does not apply conditions, which are not directly 
linked to the specific aid intervention.  
4.1.1 Potential advantages and limitations of Results-Based Aid  
So far, limited practical experience of the effects of RBA is available. However, based on ongoing 
aid debates, and experience from some of the current pilot projects based on an RBA approach, 
Klingebiel and Janus (2014) present some considerations on potential advantages and limitations of 
the RBA approach7. Strengthened recipient country ownership is argued as one of the few, but clear, 
advantages of the approach; while the list of limitations include concerns about the modality’s effects 
in more complex development sectors, the risk of non-disbursements, and short-term thinking to 
achieve quick results.  
The advantages and limitations of an RBA approach strongly depends on the specific design of the 
specific RBA program. Klingebiel and Janus (2014) argue that the RBA modality will only become 
an innovative aid modality if designed properly. Many questions about the effectiveness of the RBA 
modality still remain unanswered, and researchers call for more and better evaluations of the 
application of the modality (See Pearson, 2011; Perrin 2013). However, relevant for this thesis, is 
Mark Pearson’s (2011) argument that a higher consistency between the RBA approach and the 
principles of the Paris Declaration is needed. Klingebiel and Janus (2014) emphasise the necessity of 
the RBA approach to be able to ensure real recipient county ownership if to be more successful than 
previous aid modalities.      
 
 
                                                   
7 The full list of advantages and limitations can we found in Appendix a  
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The Cash on Delivery Aid model is designed to allow donors and recipients to escape the lacks of the 
aid system that are currently being addressed in the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’ (Birdsall et. al.2010). 
Gelb and Hashmi (2014) and Andrews et. al. (2010) refer to the model as the purest form of results-
based aid. Thus, the model is in this thesis understood as an ideal model for a results-based aid 
approach.  
4.2 The Cash on Delivery Aid Model  
The COD Aid approach is a keystone in the Centre for Global Development’s aid effectiveness 
research. The model is explained in, ‘Cash on Delivery – A new approach to foreign aid’ published 
in 2010 by Nancy Birdsall, William D. Savedoff, Ayah Mahgoub and Kathine Vyborny. 
The basic objective of Birdsall et.al. (2010) were to develop and disseminate a simple and practical 
approach to development aid, that can help official and private donors realise the reforms they have 
promised on paper, but failed to deliver on the ground. The COD aid model addresses the issues of, 
lack of coordination, lack of ownership, lack of alignment with recipient-country priorities, lack of 
results, lack of transparency and lack of evidence about results. The model aims to fundamentally 
change the way aid operates, and a key interest is to change and improve the relationship between 
donors and recipients (ibid.:30). The approach was developed through a comprehensive process of 
research, which entailed background papers from experts, interviews with practitioners, and extensive 
consultations with officials, technical experts and civil society representatives in aid recipient 
countries.  
4.2.1 The Model’s Key Principles  
The core of the COD aid approach is a contract between for donors and a recipient-government, based 
on agree upon and mutually desired outcome(s), with fixed payments for each unit of confirmed 
progress. COD aid is based on five key features: (1) Payment for outcomes, not inputs; (2) Hands-off 
donors and responsible recipients; (3) Independent verifications; (4) Transparency through public 
dissemination; (5) Complementarity with other aid programmes.  
By paying only for outcomes instead of inputs, COD aid dissociates itself from traditional aid 
modalities where donors specify and monitor inputs. The outcome or outcomes must be mutually 
agreed on by donor and recipient, and they must be measurable and continuous, to make it possible 
to reward incremental progress. At no point must the donor specify or monitor inputs.  
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The hands-off approach means that donors should emphasise the power of incentives rather than 
guidance and interference. Donors being hands-off means that the recipients have complete discretion 
and the responsibility to deliver results; right from the initial design and planning through to the 
implementation of strategies. Any technical assistance8 is demand-driven by recipients. Furthermore, 
the funds recipients receive after progress has been verified can be used in any way determined by 
the recipient.   
Independent verifications mean that progress toward the agreed outcome(s) has to be independently 
verified by a third party. Donor and recipient have to agree on the third party that is to conduct a 
financial- and a performance audit to verify progress towards the agreed outcome(s).  
Transparency is to be achieved by publicly disseminating the content of the COD aid contract itself, 
the amount of progress, and the payment for each increment of progress. The condition on 
transparency aligns with the goal of increasing accountability.  
COD aid can and should complement other aid programmes. This means that COD aid should be 
introduced in addition to other aid flows in the recipient country, without disrupting ongoing 
programmes. (Birdsall et. al., 2010: 17-19) 
4.2.2 Key Principles for Implementation  
The COD aid process entails five basic steps. The first step is for the donor and recipient to negotiate 
and sign a contract. The contract negotiation includes the measure of progress, the amount of payment 
for progress, the length of the agreement’s term, and a list of mutually agreed auditors. The second 
step is for the recipient to take action, and develop a strategy to achieved the agreed upon goals. It is 
the recipient, who defines and pursues the route to progress. The third step is for the recipient to 
measure outcomes and make the collected data public. The fourth step is the independent audit, which 
is to verify the recipients’ reports on outcomes. When all four steps are completed, the fifth step of 
payment occurs. The COD approach recommends a minimum contract period of five years, during 
which, step three, four and five would be repeated annually (Birdsall et. al. 2011:20).  
 
 
 
                                                   
8 Technical assistance is defined as the transfer, adaptation, mobilisation, and utilisation of service, skills, knowledge 
and technology. Technical assistance includes long-, and short-term advisers and consultants, training activities, study 
tours, seminars and institutional cooperation. (Guidelines for technical assistance, Danida, 2009)  
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4.2.3 The donor-recipient relationship  
A fundamental aim for the COD aid approach is to change the roles and responsibilities of donors 
and recipients in the design and implementation of aid programmes. In figure 3.0, Birdsall et.al. 
(2010) illustrate how the extent of donor involvement in the COD aid model differs from traditional 
project aid and Policy-based loans/budget support.  
Figure 3.0: (Birdsall et.al. 2010:23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in the figure, donors are involved in the four initial phases: identification, design, 
negotiation and approval, which only refers to the first step of the implementation process – the 
contract negotiation (ibid.:17).  
4.2.4 Advantages and Concerns  
“We have devised an approach that we believe will foster accountability, build local ownership, 
permit learning by doing, and work even in fragile states – while also attracting new private 
donors, enable donor coordination, reducing administrative burdens, and facilitating the 
expansion of aid.” (Birdsall et. al., 2010:21) 
In the quote above Birdsall et. al. (2010) emphasise the qualities of the COD aid model. In ‘An 
introduction to Cash on Delivery Aid for Funders’ by William Savedoff and Rita Perakis (2014), 
additional advantages of the model is emphasised.  
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COD Aid:  
§ Aligns incentives to achieve outcomes rather than buying inputs  
§ Shifts resources and staff time away from monitoring processes and towards measuring 
achievements. Furthermore, technical assistance is only provided by demand of the 
recipient government 
§ Ensures ownership and responsibility to recipient countries, creating space for learning, 
innovation and sustainable impact 
§ Increases citizens’ ability to hold their governments accountable for results 
§ Reduces waste because the donor only pays for results that are delivered 
§ Limits corruption by paying for results that recipients can only achieve by reducing abuses 
(Savedoff and Perakis, 2014:1) 
Given that the COD Aid model, as well as other RBA approaches, is a new approach with limited 
results to show for its existence, there are only a few direct critics. However, it is possible to find 
sceptics and opponents to the general concept of result- or performance based aid, which will be 
addressed in the discussion chapter of this thesis. A table of frequently voiced concerns about the 
COD aid model and Birdsall et.al. (2010) responses to these concerns is enclosed in Appendix a.9 
4.3 Recap of Results-Based Aid and the Cash on Delivery Aid Model 
 A results-based aid modality is characterised by a few core features, such as tying aid disbursements 
to measurable results, only paying for outcomes, and a hands-off donor approach, which separates 
the modality from previous approaches to aid management and aid delivery. In this thesis, the COD 
aid model is applied as a form of ideal model for a results-based aid approach. There are three reasons 
behind this decision. First, according to William Savedoff the COD aid model has served as an 
inspiration to other popular RBA models (Appendix b). Secondly, the COD aid model calls for a 
change in the donor-recipient relationship, and focuses on the issue of recipient-country ownership. 
Third, the COD aid model has not yet been implemented as envisioned in the five key features, which 
make the design and implementation processes of programmes based on the model analytically 
interesting.  
 
                                                   
9 More concerns can be found here: http://www.cgdev.org/page/cash-delivery-aid-faq 
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In the presentation of the model above, a detailed explanation of the more technical features of the 
model, such as setting the right price for progress; or how to set and measure indicators, have been 
left out. This is because the research of this thesis are more interested in the features of the model that 
characterise the relationship between donors and recipients. In the analysis of the relationship 
between results-based aid approaches and ownership, the notion of recipient discretion and the 
feature of hands-off donors are key to understand the challenges of implementing the ‘pure’ COD aid 
model.  
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5. Analysis  
5.1 Identifying Barriers to Ownership in the Partnership Era  
The main objective for this part of the analysis is to identify some of the barriers to improve recipient-
country ownership within the current aid system. This is accomplished by analysing the effect that 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Budget support have on recipient-country ownership. 
Furthermore, this analysis serves the purpose of elucidating interesting forms of donor behaviour 
exercised under the framework of ‘development partnerships’. Lastly, it is important to mention that 
the objective of the following sections is not to pass judgement on the two aid modalities in their 
entirety, but only in terms of the relationship between ‘ownership’ and the individual modality.  
“The verdict is still out on whether or not new practices in foreign assistance over the past 
decade have actually fostered positive change, but a few things are clear. The hotels and bars 
catering to foreigners haven't closed down, and donor emblems still dot the landscape.” 
(Swedlund, 2011:2) 
As already stated, this thesis studies the notion of ownership from a power perspective; therefore an 
analysis of improved recipient-country ownership is conducted based on the question of whether a 
specific aid intervention has led to increased control and power in the hands of the aid recipient. To 
be able to analyse how budget support and the PRSP approach have affected recipient-country 
ownership, it is useful to have some guiding principles for what the notion of ownership looks like in 
practice. Even though there is no clear-cut definition of this, I find that Swedlund’s (2011) notion of 
the predictions of ownership is a useful benchmark for defining what ownership in practice looks 
like.  
The predictions of ownership are based on the fundamental assumption that ownership materialises 
in the form of increased participation of recipient governments, in the planning and design phase of 
development policies and strategies in donor-funded development projects. The predictions of 
ownership are composed of three expected effects of increased participation: increased influence of 
the recipient country government; decreased influence of donors; and increased influence of domestic 
actors (Swedlund, 2011:27). However, Swedlund argues that it is not a matter of course that increased 
participation will lead to increased ownership, because the concept of participation is encumbered 
with faulty assumptions. 
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Therefore, it is relevant to keep the following three arguments in mind when assessing whether 
increased participation by recipients, as a result of the budget support- and PRSP processes, actually 
leads to the three envisaged effects.  
First, greater participation does not necessarily mean greater influence. Swedlund argues that it is 
necessary to be able to distinguish between participation and influence. Giving recipients a place at 
the table, does not automatically lead to increased influence. By assuming that participation and 
influence are the same thing, important nuances in the positioning of power in the donor-recipient 
relationship are ignored (ibid.:30). Second, donors are unlikely to relinquish their influence. 
Swedlund argues that there is very little reason, both theoretically and empirically, to assume that 
donors will be willing to relinquish their influence over development policies in recipient countries. 
Donors have more than just altruistic motives for giving aid; they have interests they wish to protect 
and preferences that do not just change overnight (ibid.:32). An example of donors’ resistance to 
relinquish control is in donor rhetoric on ‘ownership’; here ownership is often referred to as 
commitment, not control (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009). Third, government influence does not equal 
more influence for domestic actors. There is no evidence to suggest that increased recipient- 
government participation will lead to increased influence of domestic actors. As long as revenues 
come from donors, and not from taxpaying citizens in recipient countries, the likelihood of the 
development of stronger citizen-sanctioning mechanisms are low (Swedlund, 2011:33). The three 
effects of participation, and the associated faulty assumptions, will work as guiding principles 
throughout the following sections of this analysis.  
5.1.1 The Partnership Era  
“By 2000 a complex conditionality and surveillance regime had been developed and imposed 
on aid recipients, sucking away the initiative they might have taken in designing national 
policies and leaving them strikingly little room to manoeuvre across a wide range of policy 
areas.” (Fraser, 2009:46) 
It is from the reality described above that the ‘partnership era’ emerges within development 
cooperation, with concepts of poverty, partnerships and participation as its mantra. The partnership 
era brought with it new aims for development aid; new ways of thinking on how aid relationships 
should operate; and new aid practices. The new focus on partnerships was marked by the realisation 
of the importance of country owned development.  
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The rhetoric on development partnerships was supposed to represent a break with the hard-line 
conditionality, which donors and recipients were used to under the much-criticised IMF Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. As a result, the lexicon of the aid industry shifted from conditionality 
towards ideas of ownership (Mold, 2009). This is not to say that this was the end of conditionality, 
but it meant that the IMF and the World Bank changed their practices of conditionality (Booth, 
2008a). The IMF stated that, beyond a core of ‘essential issues’, there should be a ‘policy space’ in 
which members’ choices would not affect the Fund’s willingness to support them (Whitfield & Fraser, 
2009:86). However, Killick’s study on IMF conditionality from 2006 finds little systemic evidence 
to show that borrower governments were given more policy space under the new conditionality 
regimes (Killick, 2006:259).  
Furthermore, the discourses of the aid relationship changed. They changed from the discourses of 
‘recipient’ and ‘donor’ to ‘partners’; to symbolise a more equal aid relationship.  Swedlund points to 
an interesting transition that occurs when discourses change from donor-recipient relations to 
partnerships. “Donors become more than ‘the money’ when they shift from being a donor to being a 
partner. […]When donors become “partners”, they can be involved in strategy and work to advance 
their own goals” (Swedlund, 2013:363).  
5.1.2 Ownership and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers  
The World Bank and the IMF launched the PRSP approach with the aim of helping countries improve 
their national development strategies. This approach represents a key model of partnership-based 
collaboration (Joseph, 2010b). The approach stipulates that governments in low-income countries 
prepare their own PRSP through a participatory process. Embodied in the PRSP approach is the 
Comprehensive Development Framework, which advocates the principle that a poverty reduction 
strategy should be prepared by the government, through a country-driven process that includes broad 
participation promoting country ownership (World Bank, PRSP Sourcebook).  In practice, the PRSP 
process requires that countries applying for debt relief must produce a document describing their 
macroeconomic, structural, and social policies, as well as layout of programmes to promote growth 
and reduce poverty (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009:82).  
The PRSP approach portrays recipient-country ownership as a normative goal and decisive element 
for its success. However, in the PRSP framework there remain many opportunities for donors to push 
recipients to adopt their preferred policies.  
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Based on their study of contemporary aid relationships, Whitfield and Fraser (2009) argue that donors 
have a lot of influence in the PRSP process of the partner country, because they have the final say 
over whether the plans are approved or rejected. Recipient governments, and other stakeholders 
involved in the planning process, are well aware of the fact, that the much-needed aid will not be 
available to them if the plans are not approved. This serves as a heavy incentive for recipients to 
design strategies that match the donor’s notions of ‘best practice’. Furthermore, Whitfield and Fraser 
point out that donors consider themselves to be major stakeholders in a PRSP process and therefore 
take an active role in consulting and injecting their own views of the right policies and strategies 
(ibid.:84). From a study into the scope and nature of the challenges that African countries face during 
the preparation and implementation of their PRSPs; Fantu Cheru (2006) argues that when donors are 
heavily involved in the planning process it leads to,  
“[…] the principle of ‘national ownership’ being undermined by the tendency of donors to 
pursue their own timetable, set their own conditions, and demand their own information, largely 
unrelated to the government in question’s own poverty reduction strategy process.”                       
(Cheru, 2006:358)    
Driscoll and Evans (2005) examine the technical and political challenges, which new generations of 
PRSP’s need to take into consideration, in order to offer a greater contribution to aid effectiveness. 
Their study suggest that the first generation of the PRSP approach has not translated into a norm 
where donors step back from influencing recipient-country strategies and policies. A central reason 
for this is that strict conditionality still influences the planning processes of a country’s PRSPs. Based 
on eight country studies into policy conditionality, Dijkstra (2005) emphasises that the PRSP’s 
typically include conditions for practically all sectors; including macroeconomic stability, protection 
of poverty, public institutions and governance. A 2009 OECD study by Andrew Mold into ‘policy 
ownership and aid conditionality’ raises a similar point:“[…] ironically PRSP conditionality has 
arguably had a much wider impact than traditional contract conditionality because it ties support to 
policies that change the structures of entire sectors” (Mold, 2009:31).  
So far there is nothing that suggests that the introduction of the PRSP approach has resulted in a 
decrease of donor influence. Furthermore, Cheru (2006) suggests that, in most cases, the PRSP 
process has not significantly increased the influence of recipient governments or other domestic 
actors.  
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The World Bank’s sourcebook on PRSPs states that, the approach aims to encourage participatory 
processes within government (among central ministries, parliament, and subnational governments) 
and other stakeholder involvement (civil-society groups, ethnic minorities, policy-research institutes 
and academics, the private sector, trade unions, representatives from the country’s regions). Cheru 
argues that even though the framework of the PRSP approach represents a paradigm shift from an 
ineffective donor-led and conditionality-driven partnership, to a system that puts the recipient in the 
driver seat; achieving genuine participation from local stakeholders is still a challenge (ibid.:364).  
Country studies show that in most PRSP countries, national parliaments and other elected officials 
have not been actively involved in the PRSP processes (ibid.:366). Cheru (2006) suggests that the 
PRSP initiative has mainly been successful with reform processes, and opened new spaces for policy 
dialogue, in countries where principles of accountable governance, participation, country ownership 
and clear poverty focus in national planning, were already in place.  
It seems reasonable to question that the introduction of the PRSP approach has led to improvements 
in recipient-country ownership. Based on the predictions of ownership, there is nothing to indicate 
that the RPSP approach has led to, a decrease in donor influence; a pronounced increase in recipient 
government influence; or increased influence of domestic actors. This is not to say that the launch of 
the PRSP approach has not led to substantial changes in donor policies and practices. The introduction 
of budget support is another change in donor practices that aim to deliver better aid and achieve 
sustainable development results. Like the PRSP approach, budget support is promoted as an aid 
modality that can improve recipient-country ownership. However, when put under the ownership 
scope, a different story is revealed.  
5.1.3 Ownership and Budget Support   
Proponents of budget support argue, that compared with other aid modalities, budget support 
improves aid effectiveness by increasing state capacity, harmonizing donor activities, and above all, 
improves the degree of recipient-country ownership (Swedlund, 2013:357). Budget support is a form 
of program aid that transfers resources directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country, 
allowing the recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting structures 
(Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006). Broadly speaking, we can talk about, sector budget support (SBS), 
which is targeted towards specific sectors, such as health and education; and general budget support 
(GBS), which is aid that is not earmarked for any specific purpose (ibid.).  
40 
 
In a synthesis report on Good governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction published in 2008 
by ‘The Advisory Board for Irish Aid’, David Booth points to two key challenges of GBS. First, GBS 
has failed to become an exclusive or dominant modality. Even in contexts where the technical and 
political conditions for a shift towards GBS are quite favourable, other (and more traditional) 
modalities such as project support or other heavily earmarked contributions, tend to expand much 
faster. Secondly, in various ways, current GBS programmes do not practice what their advocates 
preach. Notable in terms of donors’ willingness to desist from micromanaging and to abandon 
previous approaches to disbursement conditionality, the GBS practice is often out of line with its own 
theory (Booth, 2008a:10). These two challenges are strong examples of donor behaviour that 
undermines the modality’s potential of improving recipient-country ownership. Booth (2008a) 
furthermore points to the problem of donors not implementing GBS as theoretically intended. As a 
result, the basic incentives of the aid modality are distorted, which is also the case with the results-
based aid programmes analysed in following analysis chapter. However, in the case of budget 
support, it is also relevant to analyse how the basic procedures and mechanisms that constitute the 
aid instrument, can be used by donors to exert leverage over recipients, and thus undermine the 
intended effects of improved recipient-country ownership.  
In Swedlund’s 2013 study of the relationship between budget support and recipient-country 
ownership, based on country studies in Rwanda and Tanzania, she considers how budget support 
influences donor-government relations in aid dependent states. Swedlund notes that, ”[…] although 
budget support has resulted in important qualitative changes in the aid landscape, it is not at all 
surprising that there is little evidence that budget support has resulted in the type of ownership 
envisioned in seminal policy declarations” (Swedlund, 2013:358).  In addition to this, she adds: “In 
contrast to conventional rhetoric surrounding budget support, my research suggests that some donors 
opt for budget support in part because they believe that such mechanisms will provide them with more 
leverage over domestic policy processes” (ibid.).   
The type of influence that donors try to exercise through budget support is more subtle and technical, 
but according to Swedlund that does not mean that this type of influence is weaker than previous 
types of influence. Swedlund (2013) points to three mechanisms, used by budget support donors, 
which reveal how donors try to exert leverage over recipients. First, voice amplification refers to the 
popularity of budget support among recipients, meaning that donors offering budget support are much 
more likely to be heard by recipients.  
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The second mechanism is a seat at the table. Swedlund argues that a core reason for donors to engage 
in budget support is that it gives them access to key policy groups and policy dialogue. A seat at the 
table allows donors to advocate for key reforms and policies that are important to them. The final 
mechanism is the license to ask questions across all sectors, about ‘cross-sector’ or ‘sector-
overriding’ issues, such as governance. This increases the breadth and depth of the policy dialogue 
in which donors are involved. Through budget support mechanisms, donors are able to ask questions 
on a broad number of issues that previously was out of their jurisdiction (ibid.:365-366). In 
Swedlund’s (2013) conclusion, she argues that the lines between donor and recipient involvement are 
increasingly blurred under the budget support modality.   
Rachel Hayman (2009) argues, based on a case study of the ownership strategies of the Rwandan 
government, that the concept of progressive ownership implicit within ‘aid effectiveness’ is 
misleading. Hayman argues that new modalities, like budget support, result in a type of ‘joint 
ownership’ between donors and recipient-country governments, which allows donors to be more 
embedded in policy processes than ever before. “While the joint ownership might be consistent with 
a partnership approach, it also indicates limits to the transfer of control and the unequal nature of 
the partnership” (Hayman, 2009:594). 
In terms of increased influence from domestic and local actors, Paolo De Renzio (2006) argues, based 
on a his survey of  the literature relating to the rationale for scaling up aid and improving its 
effectiveness, that donors in a number of countries are deeply involved in recipients’ core policy 
processes. In connection with budget support, De Renzio (2006) argues that when channelling most 
aid through governments, there is a risk of preventing or undermining the development of healthy 
domestic accountability mechanisms. This means that the role of parliaments, supreme audit 
institutions and civil society to promote domestic budget accountability is weakened (ibid.:637). 
In accordance with the predictions of ownership, the results from Swedlund (2013), Booth (2008a), 
Hayman (2009) and De Renzio (2006) reveal that there is no evidence of a significant transfer of 
control from donors to recipients in a budget support process. On the contrary, country studies by 
both Swedlund and Hayman conclude that donors actively become more involved in the policy 
process and, as argued by Swedlund, that they use budget support to increase their influence over 
recipient policies within a broad area of issues formerly out of their scope. With increased donor 
influence as a result of budget support processes, it is reasonable to question the level of recipient-
government influence. Furthermore, based on the literature reviewed, there is no indications that 
budget support promote increased influence of domestic actors, aside from the national government. 
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As De Renzio argues, budget support processes risk having a negative impact on the development of 
healthy domestic accountability mechanisms.  
Common for both aid modalities is that they verify the faulty assumptions about participation as 
presented by Swedlund (2011). Even though both budget support and the PRSP approach are based 
on principles of increased recipient-country influence, the heavy influence of donors in central aspects 
of the planning process seems problematic. Whitfield and Fraser (2009) argue that the stages of 
agenda-setting and policy formulation is where recipients should be in control to ensure ownership 
over national development strategies and policies. However, under budget support and the PRSP 
approach, recipients are directly and indirectly, influenced by donors in these stages to make the 
“right” decisions on development policies. Based on the analysis above, it is possible to conclude that 
the two aid modalities have had limited effect on improving recipient-country ownership.  
5.1.4 The Barriers to Improve Recipient-Country Ownership   
The barriers to improve recipient-country ownership through aid modalities, such as budget support 
and the PRSP approach - as identified in the analysis above - are a result of the mechanisms and the 
procedures of the individual modalities. However, it is also to a large extent due to the behaviour of 
donors.  
Based on the analysis above, I believe that there are two central examples of donor behaviour that 
represent key barriers to improved recipient-country ownership. The first example is the donors’ 
extensive need to be in control of every step of the process. This need to be in control can be identified 
in the continued use of extensive policy- and disbursement conditionality. Despite the partnership era 
being presented as a break with hard-line conditionality, what we see in both budget support and the 
PRSP approach, is what Whitfield and Fraser (2009) describe as ownership commitments being 
layered on top of existing conditionality regimes, instead of replacing them. Mold (2009) argues that, 
“Conditionality is in effect the other side of the coin of ownership, for without relinquishing or at 
least reducing conditionality, ownership is impossible” (ibid.:12). Donors’ efforts to remain in 
control are identifiable by the mechanisms and procedures used in both aid modalities, which ensure 
that donors are major stakeholders in the development processes; enabling them to impose their ideas 
about what should be done and how it should be done, onto the recipients.  
Donors’ convictions about how recipients should go about their development processes represent the 
second example of donor behaviour that challenges the concept of recipient-country ownership.  
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In spite of donor rhetoric of ‘no silver bullets’ and ‘one size does not fit all’, donor behaviour is 
continuously marked by the seductiveness of ‘best practices’, as expressed by Andrews et.al. (2010) 
in their extensive work of uncovering the mechanisms of persistent implementation failures. Andrews 
et.al. (2010) argue that persistent implementation failures of aid interventions are based on donors 
applying an erroneous theory of change. This theory of change is based on the donor’s belief in how 
development ‘works’ and the necessary transformations a country must go through to be considered 
developed (Andrews et.al., 2010:4). This means that the actions of donors and development agencies 
are based on the premise that it is known how these transformations unfold; that there is a common 
underlying structure that characterises them; and that professional skills acquired in a given 
development sector or context are seen as unproblematically transferable to another (ibid.). This 
means that, “[…] the abiding theory of change that underpins the actions of most large development 
agencies, national and international, is one that seeks to modernize institutions by intensifying a 
process of reform via the importing of methods and designs deemed effective elsewhere” (ibid:6). 
Recipient-country ownership is hindered by ‘best practices’ because recipient-country priorities and 
local knowledge of resources and problems risks being bypassed by donor agendas.   
A way to explain donors’ addiction to ‘best practices’ is by understanding the incentives structures, 
that guide the inherent logic of donor behaviour. Andrews et. al. (2010) argue that the underlying 
logic of the structures within the international aid system and the incentives facing development 
agencies, largely conspire against local innovation and context-specific engagement. When donors 
face complex contexts, which is the case in most aid interventions, the systemic incentives to identify 
‘proven solutions’ and ‘tool kits’ are powerful (Andrews et. al., 2010:43). Booth (2008a) furthermore 
argues that the incentives that structure donor practices are not conducive to a wholehearted shift 
away from traditional aid modalities, towards more innovative modalities that can improve recipient-
country ownership. These incentive structures are a result of strong political pressures from domestic 
audiences, which enhance donors’ risk aversion and their need to play it ‘safe’ (ibid.:48).  
Donors’ need to be in control of the aid intervention can also be explained from the perspective of 
incentive structures. However, the most fundamental explanation is concerned with the embedded 
trust issues that characterise the aid relationship. As Mold (2009) points out, the continued use of 
conditionality ultimately reflects a lack of donor trust or confidence in the capacity or commitment 
of the recipient country’s government to implement certain types of reform or policies deemed 
desirable.  
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Booth (2008a) and Hyden (2008) believe that donor behaviour exercised under the labels of 
‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ represent a problem of inconsistency between theories of change and 
reality. Booth (2008a) argues that a central problem is, that the theories about how new aid modalities 
contribute to the desired results of country ownership and improved country systems, make 
assumptions about the real world, which are typically not fully satisfied. Hyden’s (2008) study of 
power issues in the aid relationship suggests that the concept of ownership, which the ‘Aid 
Effectiveness Agenda’ rely on, presupposes a relationship of trust and mutual accountability that is 
largely untested, because issues of power remain unchallenged.  
Booth (2008a) supports this notion by arguing that,” [… ] it is clear that the moral climate has moved 
in favour of country ownership and aid alignment – perhaps too quickly and without a sufficient 
change in real convictions and organisational incentives” (Booth, 2008a:21).  
5.1.5 Part Conclusion  
Based on the analysis above, the following can be concluded. Even though aid modalities, such as 
budget support and the PRSP approach are conceived as innovating approaches to aid management 
and aid delivery, aimed at breaking with the unsuitable structures of previous aid modalities, the 
approaches have failed to bring about significant changes to the power relations characterising the 
aid relationship. This is not to say that the introduction of new aid modalities has not initiated 
important discussions and realisations about how to increase the effectiveness of aid. However, the 
mechanisms and procedures embedded in the modalities do not present strong enough incentives for 
donors to exert a less controlling behaviour in their involvement in the development processes of 
recipient countries.  
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5.2 Improving Ownership through Results-Based Aid  
The second chapter of the analysis turns the focus to the results-based aid modality and the COD aid 
model. The previous analysis established that the aid modalities that grew out of the partnership era 
have not managed to deliver on the promises of improved recipient-country ownership. Results-based 
aid programmes are the latest addition to aid approaches, which conceive the aid relationship as a 
partnership and which promotes increased recipient-country ownership as an advantage of the 
modality. In the following analysis, the objective is to take a closer look at the RBA modality, both 
from a theoretical and a practical point of view. The analysis serves two main purposes: (1) To 
establish how results-based aid and the Cash on Delivery aid model differ from previous aid 
modalities, particularly in terms of ownership. (2) To analyse donor behaviour based on 
implementation experiences from current attempts to design and implement RBA programmes.  
5.2.1 Results-Based Aid and the Predictions of Ownership  
In the previous part of the analysis, I applied Swedlund’s (2011) predictions of ownership to establish 
some guiding principles for what ownership could look like in practice. The purpose of this analysis 
is not to repeat that practice to the same extent as in the previous analysis. However, Swedlund’s 
predictions of ownership is a useful instrument to illustrate how RBA and the COD aid model, from 
a theoretical perspective, differ from the previous analysed aid modalities. The three predictions of 
decreased influence of donors, increased influence of recipients and increased influence of domestic 
actors, can be identified in the key features of the COD aid model. One of its key features is the 
emphasis on donors being ‘hands-off’ by only being involved in the contractual processes, and when 
the contract is finalised, only to be involved when it is requested by the recipient government. If 
donors comply with this principle, it should result in a significant decrease in donor influence.  
The COD aid model assumes that when donors are hands-off, recipients become more responsible 
for their own development. To strengthen the responsibility of recipients, the COD aid model shifts 
the risk of non-disbursement onto the recipient. The underlying thought behind this shift, is that 
ownership by developing countries will only be fully realised when they assume the full risk (and 
benefits) of their actions (Birdsall et.al., 2010:12). According to Birdsall et.al. imposing all the risk 
onto the recipient means that donors can leave the task of designing and implementing policy 
strategies in the hands of the recipient.  
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The COD aid model’s emphasis on increased recipient discretion represents the notion of increased 
recipient influence, which will be expanded upon in the following section.  
The analysis of budget support and the PRSP approach revealed that both modalities did not ensure 
increased involvement by domestic actors.  In that respect, the COD aid model clearly differs from 
the aforementioned modalities. The fourth key feature of the COD aid model is transparency through 
public dissemination (see chapter 4.2). The model requires that the content of the contracts, the 
results, and the payments are made public to domestic audiences in both donor and recipient countries. 
This feature supports the principles of transparency and mutual accountability. The intention is that 
by making these elements public, local stakeholders will be empowered to hold their government 
accountable. However, William Savedoff argues that this will not guarantee local involvement and 
responsiveness. Nevertheless, he argues that the publication of results and payments creates a form 
of public accountability that is lacking in conventional aid (Appendix b). From a theoretical point of 
view, the COD aid model clearly aims at fulfilling the predictions of ownership.  
5.2.2 Ownership as Recipient Discretion  
As with budget support and the PRSP approach, the primary objective of the RBA modality is not 
ensuring recipient country ownership, but it is seen as a strong advantage of a results-based approach 
to aid delivery. As mentioned in section 4.1, different models exist under the term results-based aid, 
which emphasise different benefits of an RBA approach (Gelb & Hashmi, 2014). The COD aid model 
stands out from the other approaches by strongly emphasising ownership as a major benefit of the 
model. Particularly the feature of hands-off management is considered to be an important key to 
improve recipient-country ownership. While the strong emphasis on hands-off donors as a key feature 
mainly belongs to the COD aid model, the concepts of recipient-country ownership in the RBA 
modality, can be understood from the discourse of recipient discretion.  
Perakis and Savedoff (2015) underline the importance of recipient discretion: 
“Recipient discretion is important in several ways. Recipient governments may become more 
committed to programmes that they themselves have designed and adopted. They may design 
more effective programmes by relying on local knowledge and understanding of context. They 
will also be able to experiment, learn and adapt over time rather than focus on implementing a 
predetermined blueprint which may or may not be appropriate under changing circumstances.” 
(Perakis and Savedoff, 2015:12)  
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Ownership as recipient discretion can be analysed from the features that the results-based/COD aid 
model seeks to advance. Recipient discretion is a key feature in the implementation process of a COD 
aid programme, because donors’ role in the implementation process is limited to the contract 
negotiations where, the measure of progress; the amount of payment for progress; the length of the 
agreement; and a list of mutually agreed auditors, are negotiated. Figure 3.0 in section 4.2 illustrates 
the limited involvement of donors in a COD aid programme throughout the implementation stages, 
compared to traditional project aid and budget support/policy-based loans.  Even though the figure 
shows that donors are involved in the identification and design process, this only refers to the design 
of the elements in the contract negotiations as listed above. Due to the hands-off feature of COD aid, 
recipients have complete discretion and responsibility from the initial design and planning of policies 
and strategies, right through to the implementation of those strategies (Birdsall et. al., 2010:18). 
Furthermore, an additional feature of the COD aid implementation process that supports recipient 
discretion is that recipients can seek technical support at their own discretion. They can use local 
knowledge of problems to assess which kinds of technical assistance will be most relevant for the 
implementation of selected strategies and policies (Birdsall et.al. 2010:24).  
The payment features of an RBA approach also support the notion of recipient discretion. A key 
incentive of the COD aid model is that recipients have full discretion over the use of the funds they 
receive, when progress is measured and confirmed. The payment goes to the recipient and then to 
whatever institution (public/private, NGO, subnational government, families) or other purposes 
(health, education, deficit reductions etc.) of the recipient’s choosing (ibid.).  
The final feature that seeks to ensure recipient discretion is also the most fundamental feature of the 
results-based aid approach, payment for outputs or outcomes. Whether it is payments against outputs 
or outcomes is not important to a general results-based aid approach, but in the case of the COD aid 
model, payment for outcomes is the key incentive. As illustrated by the results-chain model in figure 
2.0 in section 4.1, outputs and outcomes refer to results by either being products or services delivered 
(outputs) or direct effects on the beneficiaries of the policy (outcome). At the other end of the results-
chain, you find inputs and activities, which represent, financial, human and material resources 
(inputs) and tasks and actions undertaken to transform inputs to outputs (activities). Birdsall et. al. 
(2010) emphasise that, “At no point does the funder specify or monitor inputs. There are no required 
policies, training programs, or outside consultancies; no agreed contracts for building, renovation, 
or maintaining bricks and mortar; no specified forms of management, reforms, or decisions” 
(ibid.:18).  
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Paying only for outputs or outcomes underpins the notion of ownership in the form of recipient 
discretion. Recipients are in control of deciding how the outcomes should be achieved. Recipients 
make decisions about what resources are needed to achieve the agreed upon outcomes and which 
tasks and actions are to be undertaken to be successful in delivering the outcomes. The features of the 
RBA/COD aid approach, which supports the notion of recipient discretion, are essential to the 
analysis of how the implementation of current RBA programmes affect the models potential of 
improving recipient-country ownership. Before going in to that analysis, the following section seeks 
to outline how we can understand the aid relationship in the RBA/COD aid approach to development 
cooperation.  
5.2.3 Changing Donor-Recipient Relationships  
Birdsall et. al. (2010) define the COD aid model as a model, which aims at fundamentally changing 
the way foreign aid operates in the donor-recipient relationship and in the assignment of 
accountability, responsibility, and the focus of aid programmes. The sections above have already 
revealed features of the aid relationship in a COD aid program that aim at separating the COD aid 
model from previous and more conventional aid modalities. However, insights from the principal-
agent model are likewise relevant to understand the relationship between donor and recipient, which 
the COD aid model seeks to establish. The principal-agent model is not the only way of looking at 
the aid relationship. In some cases it is more useful to analyse the relationship as a process of 
bargaining between independent parties (Whitfield &Fraser, 2009) or as a collaboration among 
partners. However, in most cases, the principal-agent model continues to have bearing (Savedoff, 
2011:4). In addition, when analysing a contractual relationship, as is the case in an RBA agreement, 
which relies on the use of incentives to achieve results, the principal-agent model presents a useful 
framework.  
Principal-agent problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are not an issue if the principal and 
agent have converging interest and objectives (section 3.1.2 ). However, in most real cases, objectives 
diverge and the prominent issue of imperfect information affects the contractual relationship between 
principals and agents. Savedoff (2011) argues that in development cooperation, the principal and the 
agent generally share objectives or they would not be entering an agreement in the first place, but 
they also have substantive objectives that differ (Savedoff, 2011:5-6).  
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Most aid relationships are conceived as partnerships between sovereign governments, and have 
numerous overlapping objectives even if there are areas of divergence.  Yet, governments are not 
unitary actors with well-defined preferences or direct links between decisions and actions (Perakis 
and Savedoff, 2015:9).  
The COD aid model seeks to avoid the pitfalls of divergent objectives, by drawing up contracts in 
close cooperation between donors and recipients. These only comprise of common results objectives, 
to ensure that interest and objectives are as convergent as possible. However, there are examples of 
standard RBA contracts where recipients are not involved in the negotiation process and instead agree 
to achieve a set of predefined results (Birdsall et.al., 2010). Here the theoretical assumption is, as 
stated by Savedoff (2011), that recipients will not enter a contract if they have diverging objectives. 
This is particularly believed to be the case with RBA/COD aid contracts, because a key objective of 
the modality is to shift risk onto the recipient. In the principal-agent framework, agents are considered 
to be risk adverse, but in a RBA/COD aid contract the recipient agrees to take on the full risk of non-
disbursement, if they do not deliver on the agreed upon results. Shifting the risk of non-disbursement 
onto recipients influences donors’ accountability towards their domestic constituencies because they 
can proclaim that they only pay for what they get. In theory, it should also improve the trust between 
donors and recipients, because aid flows become less unpredictable and volatile (Birdsall et.al., 
2010:12) and recipients will have strong incentives to deliver the agreed upon results. However, 
donors trusting that recipients will not behave opportunistic does not seem to materialise in practice.10  
Finally, the COD aid model stresses the importance of choosing results that can be precisely 
measured, and the need for results to be independently verified by a neutral agent that both donor and 
recipient approve of. Savedoff (2011) emphasises that when results can be precisely measured, but 
not independently verified, agreements are vulnerable to opportunism. The COD aid models’ 
requirement of independent verification can be seen as an attempt to accommodate issues of imperfect 
information, without donors being forced to set up costly and intrusive information- and monitoring 
systems of their own. Instead, the assumption is that donors, to some degree, rely on recipient 
information systems, but only disburse funds when results have been independently verified.   
To sum up, the sections above lay out how the results-based aid modality and the COD aid model, 
based on the theoretical assumptions underlying the modality, stand out from previous aid modalities.  
                                                   
10 This argument will be expanded on in section xx 
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The aid relationship is characterised by close cooperation in the contracting phase, and subsequently, 
principles of hands-off management and recipient discretion guide the interactions between donors 
and recipients. However, how a model is supposed to work in theory is one thing. What happens when 
it is translated and implemented in practice is another.  
5.2.4 Implementation Experiences of RBA/COD Aid Programmes  
The following sections seek to analyse the design and implementation challenges, which can be 
identified from current experiences with implementing RBA programmes. The key interest here is to 
understand how, and most importantly why, the features associated with recipient discretion are 
altered when donors design and implement RBA programmes. I use the term ‘challenges’ because 
my assumptions are: (1) when donors alter the features of the model concerning recipient discretion, 
the RBA modality’s potential advantage of improved recipient-country ownership is challenged. (2) 
Increased recipient discretion equals increased recipient control and decreased donor control, which, 
as argued in the previous analysis, is a challenging matter for donors. 
The following sections are primarily based on data from the interview with William Savedoff 
(Appendix b) and an extensive survey, published by Rita Perakis and William Savedoff in 2015, on 
the progress and lessons drawn from current attempts of implementing RBA programmes in aid 
dependent countries. All the informants mentioned above represent the views of the CGD and are 
proponents of the COD aid model. This means that both data sources take their departure from an 
understanding of the COD aid model as the optimal design for a RBA programme. This is a deliberate 
choice because the COD aid model is in this thesis treated as an ideal model for an RBA approach to 
aid delivery. 
The translation of Key Features 
“Most results-based approaches pay lip service to these features (red. the COD aid features) but in 
practical terms, their design and implementation don’t really follow these.” ( Savedoff, Appendix b) 
When asked which of the key features donors tend to alter when implementing RBA programmes 
inspired by the COD aid model, Savedoff replies that they tend to alter all key features; with the 
exception of the feature stressing that RBA programmes must be complementary to already existing 
and ongoing aid operations in the recipient country (ibid.).   
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However, in accordance with the research scope of this analysis, the alterations of all four features 
are not of equal interest. Therefore, the following only pays attention to the features associated with 
recipient discretion11. 
Paying for Inputs Instead of Outcomes  
The most fundamental feature of an RBA approach is that donors only pay for outcomes (or outputs). 
However, Savedoff argues that donors resist paying for outcomes and instead redefine ‘results’ to 
mean inputs and activities (Appendix b). Allan Gelb and Nabil Hashmi identify an example of this 
behaviour in their 2014 study of the World Banks RBA approach – Program for Results (PforR). 
Even though a concept note on the PforR approach outlines disbursements against results, not inputs 
as a key feature of the approach (World Bank, 2011), Gelb and  Hashmi (2014) conclude, that just 
under half of the disbursements connected to the aid operations were tied to outcomes or outputs. The 
rest of the funds were disbursed based on specific policy actions or programmes for institutional 
strengthening (Gelb & Hashmi, 2014:18). As argued earlier, when funds are disbursed against inputs 
or activities, recipient discretion is reduced. In the case of the surveyed PforR projects by Gelb and 
Hashmi, more than a third of the available funds were conditional upon specific stand-alone political 
actions (ibid.:14). In this example, recipient discretion is clearly limited by the design and 
implementation of the specific RBA programme. Perakis and Savedoff’s survey from 2015 of results-
based aid programmes also reveals something about the magnitude of RBA programmes that are 
paying for inputs/activities instead of output/outcomes.  
 
Realising that the universe of results-based funding is very big, Perakis and Savedoff (2015) narrows 
their study to RBA programmes that can satisfy four relevant criteria12, where the two most basic 
features are: (1) ex-post payments to a national or local government for (2) something that measures 
or is a proxy for an output or outcome. One of the most important and surprising results from their 
research is the limited number of RBA programmes that could satisfy these two basic features 
(Perakis and Savedoff, 2015:42).  
 
                                                   
11 William Savedoff elaboration of how the features of ‘Independent verification’ and ‘Transparency through public 
dissemination’ are altered can be found in the appendix b.  
12 The remaining two features are: that the agreement has been in place for more than a year and that information about 
the program is publicly available (Perakis and Savedoff, 2015:15)  
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Perakis and Savedoff argue that payment for outcomes is important, not because it influences the 
behaviour of recipients or affects the likelihood of the outcomes being achieved, but because payment 
for outcomes is about donors’ willingness to relinquish substantial control of the programmes they 
fund. Donors’ habit of compromising when it comes to the payment feature is strongly linked to the 
second feature that they tend to alter.  
The Challenging Role of Being a Hands-Off Donor  
The second feature donors tend to alter is the principle of being hands-off donors. The hands-off 
approach is about giving recipient governments the space to choose their own policies and seek out 
the technical support that they want (Appendix b). It is furthermore about allowing the recipient 
country to use the funds according to their own priorities. Donors struggle with the notion of being 
hands-off are also exemplified by their habit of paying for inputs/activities instead out 
output/outcome. Specifying policy actions for transforming inputs to outputs and the monitoring of 
inputs, requires donors to be hands-on not hands-off. 
Savedoff believes that the hand-off approach is the most challenging feature of the COD aid model, 
for both donors and recipients (Appendix b). For donors, it is the challenge of relinquishing control 
over processes, which they normally play are a central part in. To be able to relinquish control requires 
adequate and sufficiently strong incentives for donors to take such a risk (De Renzio and Wood, 
2008). For recipients, the challenge is to fully understand and utilize the discretion and autonomy 
they would enjoy under a hands-off donor approach. Savedoff mentions the specific case of a DFID13 
RBA pilot project on secondary education in Ethiopia. Here it took some time for the Ethiopian 
officials to understand that they had full discretion in using the money, and that DFID was serious 
about only disbursing money in proportion to the predefined outcomes (Appendix b).  
Savedoff argues that donors evade the feature of hands-off management by only agreeing to pay for 
results, after approving detailed plans for the programme implementation and by requiring intrusive 
monitoring (ibid.). The four RBA programmes surveyed by Perakis and Savedoff (2015) show that 
donors in two out of the four programmes significantly undermine the hands-off approach. In one 
programme, the donor chose to withhold payment of funds until recipients provided a detailed plan 
for the use of the funds.  
                                                   
13 UK’s Department for International Development  
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In another program, the donor played an active role in negotiating strategies and policies relevant for 
achieving the predefined results and thereby constrained the recipient’s space for developing and 
executing their own strategies. All four cases surveyed by Perakis and Savedoff (2015) show that 
donors in general respect the requirement that recipients should have discretion over how to use the 
funds they are paid, when progress has been verified. In none of the programmes did the donors 
specify beforehand how recipients must use the funds they were given. However, minimal safeguards 
were put in place. The ‘GAVI Immunisation Service Support’ program, which seeks to help countries 
expand routine immunisation coverage, required that funds must be used within the health sector. In 
the programme on secondary education in Ethiopia, DFID chose to condition the disbursement of 
funds with compliance to DFID’s Partnership Commitments. This means that funds can be withheld, 
even though results are met, if recipients fail to comply with the commitments14. 
Intentional Translations  
The analysis above shows how donors designing and implementing RBA programmes tend to design 
an RBA agreement that undermines the key features of the RBA modality, which support the notion 
of recipient discretion. Perakis and Savedoff’s (2015) survey concludes that in addition to only a few 
RBA programmes being piloted, the programmes that are being tested are typically not designed to 
work through accountability and recipient discretion. Rather, most RBA programmes seem designed 
to draw attention to results, and to making them more salient to politicians and managers (Perakis and 
Savedoff, 2015:1).   
Using Røvik’s (2009) terminology of ‘translations’, the alterations of the key features of the COD aid 
model, can be understood as specific translations carried out by donors and the implementing 
agencies. Røvik’s translation theory can provide some insight into the behaviour of donors designing 
RBA programmes, and can help answer two basic questions; what are the motives for translating the 
features, and how are the features transformed. Røvik’s theory outlines three motives for translating 
organisational models when transferred from one context to another (section 3.2.1). In the case of 
donors translating the features of the RBA/COD aid model, I find that Røvik’s second motive 
concerning conflicting interest, conflicts and negotiations fits the actions taken by donors in the 
design process.  
                                                   
14The Partnership commitments are: poverty reduction and the millennium development goals respecting 
human rights and other international obligations and improving public financial management, promoting  good 
governance and transparency and fighting corruption; and strengthening domestic accountability (DFID, 2011)  
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The researched data does not show any significant evidence of donors trying to produce a specific 
local version of the model that depends on the agency conducting the program. Yet, from the RBA 
cases surveyed by Perakis and Savedoff, there are some evidence that the local context, and the actors 
involved, influence the design of the agreement to some extent. Røvik’s second motive states that in 
the context of conflicting interests, conflict and negotiations, the actors implementing the 
organisational model will create a version that does not challenge the interests and preferences of the 
adapting organisation (section 3.2.1). The analysis above reveals that the requirements of donors 
being ‘hands-off’ and ensuring recipient discretion by not paying for inputs and activities, do not 
match the preferences and interests of the donors designing the RBA agreements. Donors 
intentionally create a version that allow them to still be involved in the implementation stages, and 
control how outcomes are achieved, thereby distorting the incentives for improved recipient 
discretion.  
According to Røvik, when organisational models are transferred from one context to another, 
translation- and transformation rules explain what happens to the content of organisational ideas when 
they are transferred (section 3.2.1). Based on Røvik’s three states of translation, I find that the 
modified state of translation with the rules of addition and subtraction, best can explain what happens 
to the features translated by donors. Donors are not trying to reproduce the COD aid model by copying 
the features as exactly as possible, nor are they radically changing the content of the model by only 
using it as inspiration for a new model. Instead, the analysis shows that donors add some elements to 
the model, i.e. the Partnership Principles in the Ethiopian case, and subtract or tone down other 
elements, concerning recipient discretion, by making some disbursements conditional upon inputs 
and policy actions. These transformations do not seem to be unintentional, on the contrary, the 
choices donors make seem to be guided by a rational-strategical approach to transformation, where 
the transformation of the features is based on relatively clear intentions and instrumental calculations 
(section 3.2.1).  
So far this analysis has laid out; what donors do when they design and implement RBA programmes; 
how they translate and transform key features of the RBA/COD aid model; and, to some extent, why 
they do it. The final section of seeks to expand upon the latter.  
Following a Logic of Appropriateness   
For both donors and recipients, there is a growing interest in RBA approaches to aid delivery.  
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Recipients are interested in the programmes because of the expectation that it will give them greater 
flexibility; however, in practice the design of RBA programmes precludes this by limiting the scope 
for recipient discretion. When asked the question of why donors alter the key features of the COD aid 
model, William Savedoff notes that there are ‘small’ and ‘big’ answers to that question. The ‘small’ 
answer is that the alterations are a result of legitimate concerns held by donor agencies about e.g. the 
cost of measuring outcomes or the capacity of recipients to achieve progress without technical 
assistance. Here, donors justify their alterations without considering how the modifications 
undermine the entire logic of the model (Appendix b).  
The ‘big’ answer to the question is about what is seen as the most appropriate strategy for donors. 
Savedoff argues: 
“While these vary by agency, I think the common thread is that aid agencies have two very 
strong implicit mandates: to show that they are helping other countries by disbursing money 
and to avoid scandals. Reducing poverty, improving learning or health, and strengthening 
governance are all things that the agencies are trying to do, but they have demonstrated that 
those goals are secondary to disbursing money and avoiding scandals.” (Appendix b)  
If this is the case, adopting the pure COD aid model is problematic, because it creates a risk that 
donors will not be able to disburse money if recipients fail to achieve the agreed upon outcomes.  
March and Olsen’s logics of action offer an explanation to this behaviour by donors (section 3.2.2). 
Even though, the translations and transformations of the key features are intentional, it is not 
necessarily a result of donors carefully and rationally comparing all the alternatives (and their 
consequences) to an RBA approach before deciding on a specific design, as a logic of consequentiality 
would prescribe. Rather, donors’ actions seem to be guided by what they believe is ‘safe’ or 
‘appropriate’ based on the rules that characterise the aid relationship they are familiar with. The 
analysis of what donors do when designing and implementing RBA programmes, shows that donor 
actions are guided by a logic of appropriateness. Here the rules, which they find appropriate, help 
determine the actions taken by donors. 
In an extensive evaluation of DFID’s RBA model Payment by Results, Perrin (2013) points out, that 
concerns about the dangers of a hands-off approach to aid delivery are based on concerns of the 
compatibility between the approach and the principles and development objectives of DFID (Perrin, 
2013:10).  
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Perrin’s claim underpins the argument about donor actions being guided by a logic of 
appropriateness. March and Olsen’s theory states, “[…] actions are based on reasoning of what the 
individual conceives as appropriate and what is expected of the individual on the basis of the 
institutional identity” (section 3.2.2).  
In their note on the COD aid model, De Renzio and Woods (2008) argue that the main factor shaping 
donor’s willingness to let go of ‘old ways of doing business’ has to do with the incentives internal to 
donor agencies, partly driven by their institutional history and their upward accountability to domestic 
constituencies (De Renzio & Woods, 2008:2). Implementing the pure COD aid model means that 
donors have to change or modify routines that are a part of the organisations institutionalised 
identities. This is not something that happens overnight, which the disappointing results of Perakis 
and Savedoff (2015) prove.  
5.2.5 Part Conclusion  
From the analysis above it is possible to conclude, that the theoretical potential of the RBA modality 
to ensure improved recipient-country ownership has not been realised in the implementation of 
current RBA programmes.  The core problem is that donors translate and transform the key features 
of the model and thereby distort the incentive structures, which could ensure improved recipient-
country ownership. Furthermore, RBA programmes are designed based on the priority of ensuring 
that increased attention is paid to the delivery of results, and not based on principles of accountability 
and recipient discretion. When RBA programmes are not designed to test the potential of increased 
recipient discretion, it becomes impossible to conclude whether the RBA modality could successfully 
improve recipient-country ownership. To be able to build evidence of the effectiveness of RBA 
programmes, we must see programmes that make space for innovation and stick to the principles of 
the model, which separates it from previous aid modalities. Even though Perakis and Savedoff’s four 
case studies show that common concerns about corruption, unintended consequences, and short-
termism have not materialised, something is still holding donors back from designing and 
implementing a (pure) RBA programme that emphasises recipient-country ownership. The results 
from the analysis above are consistent with the realisations from the first analysis. Changing the way 
aid works to create better conditions to improve recipient-country ownership is extremely difficult 
because it demands a break with a strongly institutionalised constitution of the aid relationship, and 
deeply imbedded mind-sets and incentive structures guiding the interactions between donors and 
recipients.  
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5.3 The Power of Development Partnerships  
The objective of the final chapter of the analysis is to analyse the power relations that define the 
relationship between donors and recipients in the partnership era, from a governmentality 
perspective. The previous analysis chapters revealed that the aid modalities of the partnership era 
are not able to significantly change institutionalised behaviour of donors, which could lead to a break 
with the unequal power relations characterising the aid relationship in its current form. The following 
analysis seeks to argue that this can be explained by looking at the governmentality shaping the power 
relations between donors and recipients in partnership-based aid modalities. This analysis adds the 
final perspective on why these new modalities, which seek to improve recipient-country ownership, 
fall short in achieving this goal.  
5.3.1 A Governmentality Perspective on the Partnership Era   
The partnership era represents both a rhetorical shift and a shift in the practices guiding the relations 
between donors and recipients. The partnership era re-introduces the focus on recipient-country 
ownership, which subsequently has been strengthened in the emergence of the ‘Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda’. In Rita Abrahamsen’s (2004) study of the power of partnerships in global governance, she 
outlines two simplified positions within the academic debate on development partnerships. The first 
position regards partnerships as a positive initiative, seeking to increase recipients’ leadership in the 
design and implementation of development strategies. Yet, the position acknowledges the intrinsic 
difficulties of achieving a relationship of equality between rich and poor countries, given the nature 
of the aid relationship. The second position dismisses partnerships as little more than rhetoric - a 
disguise for the continued domination of the south by the north. The position holds that partnerships 
are not real, nor do they intended to transfer power to poor countries. From this perspective 
partnerships are primarily rhetorical innovations and a re-branding of old-style practices and policies 
(Abrahamsen, 2004:1456). Based on the analysis of the relationship between ownership and budget 
support/the PRSP approach, the latter position on partnerships seems to align with the results of the 
analysis. However, the second position implies that donors intentionally undermine their own 
commitments to changing how development cooperation works. I do not believe this is a fair 
characterisation of donor motives and intentions, and would argue that such a conclusion depends on, 
among other things, how the commitments of donors are interpreted. Thus, to be able to analyse the 
relationship between partnership-based aid modalities and recipient-country ownership, we have to 
look at the power of development partnerships from a more nuanced position.  
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Abrahamsen (2004) argues, “[…] the power of partnerships does not lie primarily in the relations of 
domination, but in techniques of cooperation and inclusion” (ibid.:1454).  This does not mean that 
power as domination does not exist in development partnerships, but to capture the power of 
partnerships, attention must be paid to how power produces its effects, technologies and rationalities. 
Jonathan Joseph (2010) studies poverty reduction strategies from the perspective of global 
governmentality (chapter 3.1.1).  He believes that the introduction of the PRSP approach represents 
an emphasis on evolving responsibility, by establishing governance from a distance through the 
responsibilisation of the development partner and by encouraging countries to take ownership over 
the project of developing their own poverty reduction strategies (Joseph, 2010b:35). To support this 
notion, Jacqueline Best (2007) argues, in her study of the changing relationship between the political 
and the economical in the contemporary world of global financial governance, that, “[…] the 
emerging discourse of ownership thus feeds into a conception of self-responsibility that greatly 
resembles a Foucauldian logic of self-government” (Best, 2007:96).  
Based on the notions above, governing in development partnerships resemble forms of advanced 
liberal government, as defined by Dean (1999), where government takes place through explicit 
commitments to self-government. Abrahamsen (2004) argues that partnerships invoke specific 
technologies of global liberal governance, which help produce modern self-disciplined citizens and 
states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms (ibid.:1454). 
However, advanced liberal government requires that in order to act freely, the subject must first be 
shaped, guided and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom, through systems 
of domination (section 3.1.1).  Thus, the power of partnerships can be understood as a form of power 
that seeks to govern through freedom, which Foucault defines as the condition for exercising power. 
Here, power does not delimit action by force, but by constraining the free choices of individuals 
through discursive processes of demarcating legitimate choices from illegitimate ones (ibid.). This 
form of power can clearly be identified in the PRSP approach to partnerships. As analysed in section 
5.1, recipients’ freedom to choose, and define the policies and strategies constituting their PRSPs, are 
being constrained by a clear knowledge about what donors will and will not approve. With debt relief 
depending on the approval of a recipient’s PRSP, recipient actions are governed by donors’ efforts to 
limit recipients’ choices of policies and strategies, without direct or obvious coercion, to those they 
deem legitimate.  
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Development partnerships resemble the notion of government from a distance, which means that 
government works through technologies of agency and technologies of performance. Both 
technologies can be identified in the workings of development partnerships. Technologies of agency 
establish self-managing centres, which are to be self-regulating and made accountable by the 
technologies of performance (section 3.1.1). Partnerships place recipients in the driver’s seat and 
make them responsible for their own development strategies, while simultaneously ensuring that 
recipients are held accountable through monitoring and auditing. Abrahamsen sums up the power of 
partnerships by arguing that, ”[…] partnerships derive their power precisely from the production and 
regulation of freedom, and their contracts of accountability and empowerment are simultaneously 
vehicles for relations of domination and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation” (Abrahamsen, 
2004:1463).   
The power relations characterising the aid relationship in a results-based aid modality, can also be 
understood from the notion of advanced liberal government. Donors and recipients engage in a 
contractual relationship, where recipients are responsible for the delivery of the agreed upon 
outcomes. RBA programmes apply technologies of performance by monitoring and auditing the 
recipient, through a processes of independent verification on the recipient’s progress towards the 
agreed upon results. In the ideal model, donors do not control the actions of recipients through 
domination, but by engaging recipients as free and responsible actors in their own development 
process. Here, the success of the model is contingent upon donors trusting that the modality’s use of 
the two technologies will result in recipients exercising their agency responsibly, and in a way 
consistent with the donor’s norms and values. However, as analysis section 5.2 reveals, this trust in 
the modality seems to be lacking. From a governmentality perspective, the donors’ ways of altering 
the key features of the model, which seeks to empower recipients as responsible actors, can be 
understood as donors applying technologies of performance to control the actions of recipients, when 
they are given more freedom to choose their own development strategies.  
Best (2007) describes advanced liberal government as a double-edged sword and captures the balance 
between the two technologies by noting that, “[…] the price for a small degree of autonomy is an 
even greater measure of responsibility” (Best, 2007:102). The quote from Best suggests that when a 
recipient achieves some degree of autonomy through the technologies of agency, technologies of 
performance ensure that this autonomy is counterbalanced by a greater measure of control.  
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Dean (1999) states that technologies of performance present themselves as techniques of restoring 
trust between the involved actors; however, they presuppose a culture of mistrust in professions and 
institutions, which they themselves produce, intensify and contribute to. The statements by Dean 
(1999) and Best (2007) offer an explanation to why budget support, the PRSP approach and RBA fall 
short of their aim of improving recipient-country ownership; Aid modalities, which relies on 
technologies of performance, do not break down the mistrust overshadowing the aid relationship.  
5.3.2 The Control Problems in RBA Partnerships   
As argued in section 5.1, mistrust is the most fundamental reason for donors’ need to be in control of 
the recipient’s development processes. The consequence of donors’ lack of trust in the recipient’s 
abilities to implement relevant policy reforms, result in donors altering the key features of the RBA 
modality that seeks to ensure recipient discretion. This clearly undermines the modality’s potential 
of improving recipient-country ownership. However, even in a RBA programme, which largely aligns 
with the principles of the COD aid model, mistrust constantly challenges donors’ motives for sticking 
with the principles that empower recipients as responsible and self-governing actors.   
DFID’s pilot project of results-based aid in the education sector of Ethiopia, which was briefly 
mentioned in the previous analysis, presents a good example of how trust issues distort the incentive 
structures of a RBA programme. The DFID pilot project builds upon the COD aid model and is based 
on a contract between DFID and the Ethiopian Ministry of Education. The contract defines payments 
for progress in children sitting and passing the 10th grade examination (DFID, 2011). In the pilot 
project, DFID commits to the hands-off approach and enforces the priority of recipient discretion. 
The results of the independent verifications are published in annual reports available to the public. 
The latest annual report available reveals several concerns related to mistrust in the Ethiopian 
Government and the Ministry of Education. I have selected three of the central concerns, which are 
presented below.  
The first concern is about opportunist behaviour among actors in the education system. The review 
suggests that the scope of the verification does not detect if teachers are helping students during the 
exams, which could be a rational response of teachers desperate to improve funding for their schools. 
The review recommends that if the pilot should continue, the occurrence of cheating should be 
monitored and investigated in future evaluation- and verification exercises.  If evidence is found that 
RBA is encouraging cheating, then robust counter-measures should be put in place to counteract the 
incentive (DFID, 2015:13).  
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The second concern is in connection with the hands-off approach. Here the review concludes that:  
“The hands-off approach of RBA hampers the pilot’s objectives such as tackling barriers to the 
education of children in rural areas. A strategy for building on indigenous institutional systems 
for ‘managing for results’, within the national programming and funding allocation processes, 
would be more effective in promoting institutional efficiency than the hand off approach.” 
(ibid.:4) 
The review suggest that are more involved approach would have been more effective, to ensure that 
the project could deliver on more complex objectives than increasing the number of 10th grade sitters 
and passers. The critique reflects a mistrust in the recipient’s interest or ability to improve institutional 
efficiency, as often deemed necessary by donors15. The third concern is about how the money is spent. 
A key incentive of the COD aid model is that recipients enjoy full discretion over how the funds 
allocated to them, after progress has been verified, are spent.  The review points to an increased risk 
of money being spent in areas, which are not deemed appropriate by DFID. Thus, the review 
recommends several ways for DFID to try to manage that risk. These cover: increased participation 
and monitoring; establishing safeguards and increasing earmarking of funds (ibid.:15).  
The concerns revealed in the review confirm the notion that mistrust breeds control. The 
recommendations presented above, all propose that if the pilot project is to continue, more control 
based on technologies of performance should be added to the project framework. The review shows 
that concerns of principal-agent problems clearly impact the aid programme design, even when it is 
based on the COD aid model. The outcome of these concerns are tighter control and increased 
monitoring of recipients, which will undermine recipient discretion and the potential of improving 
recipient-country ownership. Eyben (2015) sees it as a general weakness of ‘performance 
measurement systems’ that they: “[…] operate in a near-continual cycle of reform, but rather than 
history just repeating itself, each failure results in the introduction of more stringent and controlling 
practices” (Eyben, 2015:8).  
 
 
                                                   
15 See Andrews et.al. (2010) on Best practices and Isomorphic mimicry  
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5.3.3 Part Conclusion  
Ownership, from a governmentality perspective on partnership-based modalities, is promoted by the 
delegation of power to responsible and self-governing recipients through technologies of agency; 
however, the use of technologies of performance constrain the freedom of recipients in exercising 
that power. When analysing the aid relationship in the partnership era from a governmentality 
perspective, it can be argued that the power relations largely remains the same. Governing in the form 
of advanced liberal government still allow donors to exert leverage over recipients and control them 
through reporting and monitoring practices. Joseph (2010b) argues that this happens when the 
technologies of performance become ends in themselves. He notes that this is the case with the 
PRSP’s: “We can understand their aim less as actual poverty reduction than as the setting up of 
reporting processes and sectorial monitoring” (ibid.:39). In the case of RBA, the use of technologies 
of performance become problematic, when their way of producing and intensifying mistrust results 
in stricter control and monitoring of recipients. This means that the theoretical rationale of the 
modality in support of improved ownership is undermined and incentive structures are distorted. 
Thus, a final argument to why the aid modalities of the partnership era fall short of their aim of 
improving recipient-country ownership, can be found in their inability to break with governing 
practices, which sustains the unequal power relations defining the aid relationship in its current form.    
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6. Discussion  
6.1 Can Recipient-Country Ownership be improved through Aid?  
Based on the results of the three analysis chapters, and the overriding objective of this thesis to 
understand the relationship between ‘ownership’ and ‘results-based aid’, I wish to discuss a final but 
important perspective: Can recipient-country ownership be improved through aid? 
One could argue that this question should have been asked in the beginning of the thesis, but the 
reason for waiting until now before examining this question is, that based on the knowledge gained 
throughout my research about the challenges to improve aid effectiveness and development 
cooperation, the answer needs to be yes.  This means that the important question is a question of how 
and not if. Thus, the objective of the following is to discuss the role of aid to improve recipient-
country ownership, and the implications this have for results-based aid. To be able to discuss this, it 
is necessary to expand on the notion of ‘ownership’ applied so far. Ownership is still an expression 
of power and control, but it should also be understood as a desirable outcome of a development 
collaboration. Here, the responsibility is on both parties; the recipient must be willing and able to take 
ownership, and the donor must focus its efforts on enabling recipients to take ownership. This means 
that the mind-set and the structures guiding interactions between donors and recipients need to 
change.   
6.1.1 Development is Political - Not Just Technical  
“[…] the ownership principle has not been properly addressed by international thinking about 
aid effectiveness. We need to go back to basics and try to answer one fundamental question 
which has been hanging in the air since the 1990’s: does aid have a role in building country 
ownership of development efforts?” (Booth, 2011:6)  
David Booth answers his own question with a cautious yes, and suggest that it would involve a 
revolution in aid programming (ibid.:13). The revolution Booth refers to is the need of bringing 
politics back in and breaking with “the temptation of the technical” (Booth, 2011: Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013). Booth’s (2011) main argument is that the role of donors in supporting country 
ownership is about assisting the emergence of a political leadership capable of tackling the challenges 
of development.   
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However, Booth and several other critics of the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’, argue that the 
declarations of the agenda fails to acknowledge the fundamental need of assisting the emergence of 
a political leadership, which enables the recipient to take ownership over its development policies. 
Instead, the Paris Declaration sticks to the notion that aid effectiveness can be improved through a 
particular kind of technocratic planning apparatus, based on lengthy texts, monitoring matrices and 
statistical information systems (Booth, 2008b:2). Carothers and de Gramont (2013) argue that ever 
since its early years, international development assistance has had an uncertain and uncomfortable 
relationship with politics. The view that underdeveloped countries can be transformed by providing 
timely doses of capital and technical knowledge while maintaining a comfortable clinical distance 
from these countries internal political life, are still prevalent in the development aid community today 
(ibid.). Carothers and de Gramont argue that this is understandable, “[…] politics is about conflicting 
visions and objectives. Politics is about subjective values, with signs of progress hard to agree on, let 
alone measure” (ibid.:4). Furthermore, they point to an undecided discussion on whether or not there 
is a place for donors in the internal political realm of recipients. However, aid is highly political, and 
have always been, whether donors like it or not. The analysis of budget support and the PRSP 
approach clearly reveals how donors manage to be closely involved with the political workings of 
recipient governments, during the planning and design of their development policies. The problem 
Carothers and de Gramont point to, is that even when donors attempt to apply political methods or 
strive to achieve political goals through aid programmes, these programmes still operate from the 
same penchant of technical solutions as other areas of aid, emphasising the transmission of technical 
knowledge and the export of western institutional blueprints (ibid.:258). Thus, the problem is not only 
about donors getting involved in the internal politics of recipient governments, it is about the need 
for donors to understand the political complexities of recipient countries, and the inherently political 
nature of processes of developmental change (ibid.:4). However, the growing results agenda within 
aid effectiveness could be seen as a step in the wrong direction. Carothers and de Gramont argue that: 
“The growing pressure within aid circles to strictly define and measure results, as well as the 
longstanding bureaucratic constraints on flexible and innovative programming, cuts against more 
political approaches.” (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013:8)  
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6.1.2 The Potentials and Limitations of the Results Agenda  
Rosalind Eyben from The Big Push Forward16 is a strong critic of the results agenda. Eyben (2013) 
argues that the obligation to demonstrate results is increasingly dominant in reducing the 
opportunities for a flexible and responsive approach that supports empowerment processes of aid 
recipients. Eyben regards results-and evidence-based approaches to aid management, as an aim to 
build an anti-politics firewall (Eyben, 2013:19). This means that results- and evidence-based 
approaches contradict the need to take an interest in the complex politics of development, and instead 
ensures that development assistance remains a ‘technical best-practice’ intervention. Ben 
Ramalingam (2013) understands the reluctance of the donor community to acknowledge the 
complexity of aid and development cooperation, as part of the embedded rules of the game in foreign 
aid. According to Ramalingam, the use of results-based approaches to development cooperation 
reflects a, “ […] widespread bias toward seeing interconnected, dynamic, open problems as simple, 
closed problems that can be planned for, controlled, and measured”(Ramalingam, 2013:127). The 
result of simplifying complex problems is that the underlying problems, sought addressed by aid, 
does not go away (ibid.).   
The results-agenda’s approach to development and change, through linear causality processes where 
certain interventions can lead to predictable results, conflicts with the recommendations provided in 
the literature calling for more flexibility and responsiveness in aid approaches, to change the 
conditions in developing countries (Vähämäki et.al., 2011:43). Following the arguments above and 
according to Booth and Unsworh (2014), practices of the results-agenda undermine local ownership, 
and the initiative and the capacity to find solutions to recipients’ development problems. However, 
even critics and sceptics of results-based approaches agree with its proponents that a focus on results 
are important, and that these approaches can be useful in development cooperation. Carothers and de 
Gramont (2013) argue that a results focus provides the possibility to learn more about  what works – 
but when it manifest itself as in the current form of ‘results management’, it reduces rather than 
increases the space for innovation and flexibility. Eyben (2015) also acknowledges the usefulness of 
results- and evidence artefacts17, but they become problematic when they change into coercive and 
controlling instruments.  
                                                   
16 The Big Push Forward is a network in the UK, who seeks to create space for discussion, thumb debate and the 
exploration of appropriate approaches for assessing transformative development processes 
(http://bigpushforward.net/about) 
17 Tools and protocols (Eyben, 2015:20)  
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Vähämäki et.al. (2011) have conducted an extensive review of results-based management in 
development cooperation. The review points too many of the problematic concepts and notions 
mentioned by other observers. However, the review also argues that these problems largely is due to 
‘implementation problems’. This argument highly aligns with the discoveries of this thesis analysis, 
which revealed that the implementation of RBA programmes affected the modality’s potential of 
improving recipient-country ownership. Vähämäki et.al. (2011) refer to the argument of Peter 
Drucker18, about how successful results orientation is a mind-set and a perspective on learning, rather 
than a precise set of instructions (ibid.:33). However, their review reveals that results-based 
management are neither used for learning more about what works in recipient countries, nor for 
improved learning in donor countries.  Still, the question remains – how can donors and aid play a 
role in ensuring that improved recipient-country ownership is an outcome of development 
cooperation?  
6.1.3 Development is About Discovering the ‘Right Practices’  
“[…] I would argue that an epidemic of ‘best practicitis’ is afflicting aid agencies. […] the 
symptoms include the following: organisations spend all their time looking for the single right 
answer rather than diverse solutions; people spend more time trying to do things right rather 
than doing the right things; there is much more focus on knowledge transfer than on knowledge 
creation: the whole enterprise is underpinned by a search for efficiency and cost-based value-
for-money measures that assume, that what is known is needed.” (Ramalingam, 2013:26)  
The quote from Ramalingam sums up what he, and others, suggest is the central issues of the current 
aid system. The root cause is donor practices based on imagined universal solutions and international 
best practices (Booth & Unsworth, 2014:4). The argument is that the strong reliance on best practices 
results in a lack of focus on supporting learning, and a lack of knowledge creation leading to aid 
interventions becoming less diverse and less creative, despite for the scope and ambitions of aid 
expanding. “This has reinforced conservative mind-sets, outdated aid approaches, entrenched 
attitudes and sclerotic processes” (Ramalingam, 2013:29). These observations by Ramalingam align 
to a large degree with the discoveries of the analysis of this thesis. The need to break with best 
practices and proven toolkits are the key messages of ‘alternative’ models on aid management, 
presented by Andrews, Prtichett and Woolcock (2012) and Booth and Unsworth (2014).  
                                                   
18 See Chapter 1.0 
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Andrews et.al. (2012) present the model of Problem-Driven Iterative Adaption (PDIA), based on four 
principles, which they argue stand in sharp contrast with the standard approaches. The four principles 
focuses on, locally nominated and defined problems in performance; creating an authorising 
environment for decision-making that encourages positive deviance and experimentation; embedded 
experimentation in tight feed-back loops that facilitate rapid experimental learning; actively engage 
a broad set of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable. 
(Andrews et.al., 2012: 2). This approach to aid management takes into consideration the problems 
discussed above by ensuring a flexible and experimental approach, which takes its departure in locally 
defined problems, and which stresses the importance for learning and the empowerment of recipients. 
Booth and Unsworth (2014) have coined an approach they call ‘Politically Smart, Locally Led’. The 
approach is based on seven case studies of different successful development programmes. Booth and 
Unsworth (2014) summarise the success of the seven cases as result of the following elements, 
iterative-problem solving; stepwise learning; brokering relationships of trust; and discovering 
common interests. A ‘Politically Smart, Locally Led’ approach to aid interventions is about allowing 
actors to understand the complex development challenges they face, identify and negotiate ways 
forward, and find solutions that are both technically sound and politically feasible (ibid.). The case 
studies revealed that donors were able to make a useful contribution, because they adapted their own 
aspirations and practices in ways that stimulated and facilitated local policy processes without 
distorting or undermining them (ibid.:24). The core argument from Booth and Unsworth is: 
“[…] donors can facilitate developmental change in very challenging contexts, but only if they 
are prepared to align their own thinking and practices with the uncomfortable reality that 
processes of developmental change are complex, unpredictable, mainly endogenous and 
pervaded by politics.” (Booth & Unsworth, 2014:29)  
The models from Andrews, Prichett & Woolcock and Booth and Unsworth clearly show that donors 
can play an important role in the development processes of recipient countries, without necessarily 
undermining recipient-country ownership. The models suggest that donors do not need to be ‘hands-
off’, but being involved demands that they adapt a flexible and experimental approach, where they 
are willing to take some risks, learn from mistakes and find effective ways forward. If implementing 
the ‘Cash on Delivery Aid’ model is challenging for donors, the two models presented above is not 
any less of a challenge. They represent a radical shift in the way donors conceive development 
challenges and their role in addressing them.  
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They demand a change in both the mind-sets and the structures of the current aid system. They 
demand a change in the relationship between donors and recipients, where finding the right practices 
to development is a mutual process. This process should be based on some notion of co-evolution19, 
where donors and recipients both are considered to be agents, which must develop together to achieve 
optimal solutions. The two models are new, and they point in the direction the aid system needs to 
move towards to improve recipient-country ownership; but the road is long and offers no clear-cut 
answers on how to overcome the barriers and challenges of the current system.  
                                                   
19 Co-evolution is a concept used in complexity science (Ramalingam, 2013:183)  
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7. Conclusion  
The key objective of this thesis was to establish an in-depth understanding of how the results-based 
aid modality impact upon the degree of recipient-country ownership, based on a study of the dynamics 
of the aid relationship in the partnership era of aid management. To achieve this objective I have 
applied a theoretical framework, made up by different theoretical perspectives, enabling me to 
understand and give meaning to the empirical data selected for the research. The theoretical 
perspectives of, Governmentality theory, Principal-Agent theory, Translation theory, and ‘Logics of 
Actions’, have provided me with the tools to understand the power relations and trust issues of the aid 
relationship, along with the motives and mind-sets guiding donor behaviour. I have conducted my 
research based on an understanding that the structures and practices within the current aid system are 
socially constructed and sustained through human actions. The system is not constant nor is it 
unalterable, the institutionalised mind-sets and ‘collective illusions’ about change and development 
are changeable. On this foundation, I have arrived at the following conclusions.      
Based on the analysis of the relationship between aid modalities of the partnership era and 
‘ownership’ - defined as a change in the institutional relationship between donors and recipients in 
terms of power - it is possible to conclude; that none of the aid modalities deliver on their promise of 
improving recipient-country ownership. Budget support and the PRSP approach have brought 
changes to aid management and aid delivery, but fall short when it comes to improve ownership. The 
analysis reveals that donor behaviour and approaches to aid deliver under the label of ‘partnerships’ 
involves mechanisms and procedures, which ensures that donors remain heavily involved in 
controlling and deciding development policies and strategies of aid dependent countries. The 
introduction of results-based aid and the ‘Cash on Delivery’ aid model present new approaches to aid 
management and aid delivery. The modality is shaped by a theoretical rationale, which seeks to 
underpin improved ownership based on the concepts of recipient discretion and responsible - risk 
bearing- aid recipients. However, the empirical evidence on the current experiences from donors 
designing and implementing result-based aid programmes reveal, that the modality is not being 
implemented as intended. Instead, donors translate and transform the features of the modality to fit 
their own preferences and ‘rules’ of appropriate conduct in development cooperation; which 
consequently undermines the aid modality’s potential of improving recipient-county ownership. 
Furthermore, when the results-based aid modality is analysed from a governmentality perspective 
another central barrier to improve recipient-country ownership reveals itself.  
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The power of development partnerships can be understood as a form of advanced liberal government. 
Results-based aid, and the other partnership-based approaches to aid management, is a way for donors 
to govern the recipients from a distance, through technologies of agency and performance. However, 
advanced liberal government is a doubled-edge sword. The analysis shows that when aid recipients 
are given power and discretion, this power is counterbalanced by practices of control, to ensure that 
the recipients can be held accountable for their actions as ‘self-governing’ actors. Aid practices 
shaped by advanced liberal government do not change the unequal power relations defining the aid 
relationship, and they do not mitigate the strong mistrust that affects interactions between donors and 
recipients in development cooperation.  
The analysis of this thesis have identified some of the pitfalls in the current aid system to change the 
power dynamics of the aid relationship. Even though the rhetoric about the aid relationship have 
changed, and commitments to ensuring recipient-country ownership are proclaimed at the highest 
political level of development cooperation, real changes seem to be absent. The modalities analysed 
in this thesis are examples of how the aid system, in the face of crisis and criticism, have renewed 
and reinvented itself. However, I argue that these changes are only superficial makeovers that does 
not address the embedded barriers to improve recipient-country ownership, and aid effectiveness in 
general. The results from the analysis of results-based aid and ownership clearly shows, that it takes 
more than good intentions and a well-designed aid modality to change the dynamics of the aid 
relationship. The discussion of this thesis emphasise the need for a radical shift in the mind-sets 
guiding development cooperation. Critics of the current aid system call for a change in the 
relationship between donors and recipients; where development cooperation is about finding the right 
practices to ensure development - based on a mutual process - and not a one-sided obligation to 
implement best practices. This does not mean that results-based aid or results-based management in 
development cooperation is a failed paradigm; but its current form and application as part of the 
results-agenda is problematic.  For results-based aid to become an effective modality both in terms 
of delivering development results, but also in terms of changing the dynamics of the aid relationship, 
it is important to balance the modalities control aspects with its potential for increasing learning about 
what works. The alternative models and approaches to aid management presented in this thesis, state 
that the road forward in development cooperation involves acknowledging the complexity of 
development and change; establishing approaches to aid delivery that are both technically sound and 
politically feasible; and creating new knowledge about what works by realising that the individual 
local contexts matters. 
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Studying the concept of recipient-country ownership is a complicated task. There is no clear-cut 
definition of what ‘ownership’ means and what it looks like in practice. If this thesis had applied an 
understanding of ‘ownership’ as commitment, or as a measure dependent on the number of conditions 
attached to aid payments, the conclusions on the effect results-based aid have on the degree of 
ownership would maybe have looked very differently. I believe that when a principle is as highly 
prioritised as ‘ownership’, there is a need to arrive at a more clear-cut definition. Such a definition 
would bring about more clarity on the concept, and would make it a more effective analytical tool to 
‘test’, whether recipient-country ownership is improved through individual aid interventions.  
The objective of this thesis has not been about shaming donors, or to contribute to the many 
publications on the discouraging results of foreign aid and development cooperation. Granted - the 
objective has been to identify barriers and problems, but it has also been about pointing out the 
possible solutions to tear down these barriers. I believe that there is a need for more interdisciplinary 
research on how we can change and innovate the embedded structures and institutionalised mind-sets 
of the current aid system – not by starting from scratch, but by figuring out how we can improve and 
advance the tools already available to us.        
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Appendix  
a) 
Tables on Results-based Aid and The Cash on Delivery Aid Model  
 
Table 1: Advantages and Limitations of RBA  
Own table based on Klingebiel and Janus, 2014: 8-10 
Table 2: Concerns about ‘Cash on Delivery Aid’  
 Concern  Response  
1 COD aid will displace other aid programs  COD aid should only be seen as supplement to 
other aid modalities 
2 Recipients needs initial funding to achieve 
results  
COD aid is only one source of funding within the 
envelope of foreign aid and domestic spending, 
Advantages: 
§ Actions are directly aimed at providing incentives for results 
§ Incentives for performance 
§ Strengthened ownership on the part of the partner government.  
§ Better verification of the results of aid 
Limitations: 
§ High demands for the responsiveness of the recipients political systems to incentives and 
their capacity to deliver results 
§ A strong a focus on a specific outcome can lead to adverse incentives, unintended 
consequences and non-systemic analysis and strategies 
§ Result-based aid cannot be implemented equally well in all sectors 
§ Result-based aid is not an instrument for expanding opportunities for policy dialogue 
§ Insufficient pre-financing capacities of recipients    
§ Risk of non-disbursement of aid due to factors that are out of the recipient governments 
control 
§ A focus on short-term perspective in order to achieve results quickly 
§ Unambitious results due to a common interest ensuring aid disbursements 
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therefore the money for initial investment should 
be found elsewhere 
3 Unintended consequences: undesirable  
diversion of funds from one sector to 
another; negative impact on the quality 
of services (i.e. lower quality of 
education in COD aid education 
programs); funding directed to better-off 
areas where progress are easier to 
achieve 
(1) The diversion of funds can be mitigated by 
ensuring that the size of the payment is large 
enough to cover the cost of progress, so that 
funding for other priorities will not be affected. 
(2) The quality concern can be meet by 
considering how outcomes are identified and 
measured. 
(3) The consequence of funds being directed to 
those better off is  as an unavoidable trade-off that 
always exist when decisions on expanding public 
services are made 
4 The risks of corruption and waste  when 
recipients are given full discretion in 
using funds  
Donors can establish standards for public 
financial accountability as a condition for 
eligibility for COD aid funding – or donors can 
accept the risk and remember, that regardless of 
how the money is spent, the desired progress has 
been achieved  
5 The difficulty of measuring outcomes This is a design challenge and the only way of 
setting correct outcome measures, is by making 
them for a specific context, specific goals and 
specific countries, and in collaboration with local 
and international experts 
6 Problems with non-disbursement of aid 
funds if progress is not achieved 
Tying aid disbursements to the delivery of results 
is the most fundamental incentive in the COD aid 
model. The risk of non-disbursement can be 
mitigated by establish contingencies for the use of 
funds for other public purposes 
Own table based on Birdsall et.al., 2010:30-35  
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b)  
Interview with William Savedoff  
Written interview with William Savedoff from the Centre of Global Development. The answers were 
received on December 4, 2015. Mr. Savedoff is the co-author of ‘Cash on Delivery - a new 
approach to foreign aid’ (2010:2011)  
Questions for ’Cash on Delivery Aid’  
Ø How does COD aid differ from other result-based aid approaches?  
Answer: Nancy and I focused on 5 features for COD aid: paying for outcomes not inputs, hands off 
funders and responsible recipients, independent verification, transparency (information public to 
encourage accountability) and complementary to other funding sources.  You can find these 
described in detail in our book COD Aid: A New Approach to Foreign Aid. 
Most results-based aid approaches pay lip service to these features but in practical terms, their 
designs and implementation don’t really follow these. The biggest difference is that aid agencies 
find it difficult to be “hands off” for a variety of reasons. Only the Norwegian forest program with 
Brazil comes close. Rita and I explain this in “Does RBA Change Anything?”  
Ø What essential factors need to be present for COD Aid to be effective?  
Answer: See above. 
Ø Have projects been implemented that are outright based on the COD Aid model?  Or can we 
only talk about projects that have adapted some of the key principles?  
Answer: The UK’s RBA programs in Rwanda and Ethiopian education were explicitly inspired by 
our COD Aid book, though the practical application is not 100%. The World Bank P4R modality 
was designed and influenced by our work on COD aid, permits bank staff to proposed COD Aid 
programs, but is not exclusively COD Aid.  
 
Ø Are there some parts of the aid contract/ model that are more challenging for donors and/or 
recipients to adapt to? 
Answer: The COD Aid model is challenging for donors and recipients in many ways because it 
fundamentally alters the conventional aid relationship that has been built and sustained for more 
than half a century and which serves many interests. 
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 I believe the biggest challenges for donors in adopting the model are to become more “hands off”. 
 I believe the biggest challenge for recipients is to fully understand and utilize the discretion and 
autonomy that they would enjoy under a COD aid program. After the UK and Ethiopia signed the 
RBA program for secondary education, it took Ethiopian officials time to understand that they had 
full discretion in using the money, that DFID was serious about disbursing money only in 
proportion to student completion, and then to relate the new dynamic to regional and local officials. 
By the third year of the program, the Ethiopian government fully understood the nature of the RBA 
program but then the UK chose not to continue funding it. A lost opportunity to see what would 
have happened. 
 
Ø Can you point to some components of the model that donors tend to alter or discard?  
Answer: Donors tend to alter all four of the essential features. They undermine “hands off” by 
insisting on detailed plans and intrusive monitoring; they pay for inputs and activities rather than 
outcomes (see Alan Gelb’s working paper on World Bank P4R cited in Perakis and Savedoff); they 
don’t put enough money or thought into independent verification (see GAVI example in Perakis and 
Savedoff); they don’t publish results and payments in ways that common people can find or 
understand.  
Follow up response – received 17.03 2016  
1.       Pay for results (outcomes) not inputs – they resist paying for outcomes and redefine “results” 
to mean inputs or activities 
2.       Hands off – they agree to pay for results only after approving detailed plans and requiring 
intrusive monitoring 
3.       Independent verification – they try to use existing data and minimize expenditures on 
verification 
4.       Transparent – they rarely define results in easily understood terms and when they do , they fail 
to publish it in easily understood format 
5.       Complementary to existing aid – well, okay, they do fulfill this one. 
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 So the question is “why?” 
 There are “small” answers to this question. Agency staff justify modifying these features, sometimes 
based on legitimate concerns, but without paying attention to the way the modifications undermine 
the entire logic of the model. So, for example, agency staff will argue that measuring outcomes is too 
costly – but then the program ends up paying for inputs and we never know if the program had its 
desired impact. Similarly, they argue that recipient countries lack the capacity to achieve progress 
and assume that the aid agency’s technical expertise will guarantee that a good plan will result in 
good outcomes. This hubris has limited evidence to back it up. 
  
If you check the FAQs on the CGD website, you’ll see a long list of questions which are related to 
the objections agency’s raise against doing COD. 
  
There are “big” answers to this question, too. While these vary by agency, I think the common thread 
is that aid agencies have two very strong implicit mandates: to show that they are helping other 
countries by disbursing money and to avoid scandals. Reducing poverty, improving learning or 
health, strengthening governance are all things that the agencies are trying to do, but they have 
demonstrated that those goals are secondary to disbursing money and avoiding scandals. If this is 
what is going on, then, the big reason that agencies aren’t adopting the pure COD model problem is 
that it creates a huge risk that the agency won’t be able to disburse money. The other reason, I think, 
is that it suggests that the agency’s technical inputs and engagement aren’t the primary motor for 
change. 
 
Ø How can the model be instrumental in recipient government’s processes of 
changing/establishing central policies for a desired sector? – any experience from the pilot 
projects of new extensive policy reforms as a result of a COD aid project?  
Answer: COD Aid makes space for recipient governments to choose their own policies and seek out 
the technical support that they want. This is different from conventional aid where they have to 
analyze, negotiate and design programs in ways that satisfy whoever is funding the program. This 
creates the possibility that a recipient government will be able to do something effective which may 
or may not require extensive policy reforms. Conventional aid approaches try to force recipient 
countries to reform policies and usually fail (there’s an extensive literature on the failure of 
83 
 
“conditionality”). Take a moment to think about a problem in your own country and ask yourself 
how your government and citizens would respond if a World Bank or USAID team showed up and 
said, we know how to help you solve your problem and will negotiate the policy reforms that you 
need. 
Technical question:  
Ø How does a donor decide on the ‘right amount’ for each unit of progress? What needs to be 
included in the equation?  
Answer: There is no “right” amount for each unit of progress. Funders get to choose what they 
want to pay and can choose many criteria: large prize, average unit cost, marginal unit cost, 
partial subsidy, small prize. The idea of a right amount reflects a notion that there is a technical 
and objective way to calculate the unit cost and there isn’t. Instead, we have recommended two 
approaches to selecting the amount. The one which is analytically more determinate is to 
compare the funder’s willingness-to-pay to the recipient’s willingness-to-accept. This generates 
a range within which funder and recipient can negotiate (This is described in 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21622 toward the end of the paper). The 
other approach, which is more practical, is for funders to propose an amount which is described 
as a partial subsidy (requiring the government to put in some of its own money) but which is 
also likely to be large enough in the aggregate to be of interest to high-level politicians. The 
exercise we presented in the COD Aid book is a practical demonstration of what this would look 
like in a typical sub-saharan African country. Kenny and Savedoff shows why a partial subsidy 
is better than full cost, because it is attractive to honest counterparts and less attractive to 
dishonest (and uncommitted) ones. 
Recipient country ownership:  
Ø How would you characterize the relationship between donor and recipient in a COD Aid 
relation?  
COD breaks the relationship into two separate parts. First, a contractual relationship which 
measures results and determines the annual flow of funds. Second, a process of problem-solving 
led by the recipient government and which involves funders at the recipient government’s 
discretion in providing technical assistance, ideas, encouragement, and support. 
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Ø Does the model ensure incentives for increased involvement of local stakeholders? (Local 
government,  CSO’s etc. ) If yes, how?   
Answer: The model requires that results and payments be made public. This can empower local 
stakeholders to hold their government accountable but it does not ensure local involvement or 
responsiveness. Nevertheless, the publication of results and payments creates a form of public 
accountability that is lacking in conventional aid, so I view COD aid as an improvement. There 
is nothing in conventional aid that “ensures” local stakeholders are empowered – look at the 
literature on the failure of the Poverty Reductions Strategy Programs which required local 
consultation but were typically written up by consultants with limited local engagement. 
Ø Is it possible for donors to control how the aid money is spent without distorting the models 
incentive structures?  
Answer:  No. 
Ø Is the experience from the pilot projects that we see stronger and more committed 
recipients? - Do donors see more involved and self-assured recipients during the 
implementation process? 
Answer: There is no foreign aid model that can “create” more committed recipients. We can only 
(1) try to judge who is committed or (2) reveal who is committed by what they do. Aid agencies 
have incentives to claim that recipients are committed because that’s how they can justify approving 
programs. By contrast, COD Aid relies on demonstrating commitment by achieving development 
outcomes. 
Ø Are there examples of the model being implemented in fragile states?   
USAID has several programs that are close to COD Aid in Afghanistan. Every time we pay 
Equatorial Guinea or Sudan for oil, we are paying Cash on Delivery. But we get oil instead of 
education and health. 
 
 
